Thursday, February 25, 2010

We Don't Need Another Hero...

The development of heroes is somewhat natural, but we don't need any more. A hero is a person who is excellent in the eyes of the general population. But this doesn't necessarily make the hero virtuous. A hero could easily have faults that the general population doesn't know about. Also, although it is questionable whether a hero has actually achieved happiness (whether in current terms or Aristotle's terms), the first heroes had no model hero that they emulated. They earned virtue of their own means.... no need for a hero.

If the people follow a hero who appears to have almost "superhuman" capabilities, they may never find the drive to reach their own fullest potential. If they believe they will never reach the level of virtue of their hero, the people may just give up on achieving virtue altogether. If a person believes a hero will always be there to save him, he may never worry about his own personal and moral responsibility.

Why We Need More Heroes

It seems like we already have a lot of heroes in our society so why would our society need another?
-Due to the diversity of our society we need a diverse group of heroes
-We always have someone to look up to, we always have hope.

Monday, February 22, 2010

Telos and Eudaimonia

According to Aristotle's theory of virtue, every human being has certain goals to achieve during their lifetime. This is called telos. More specifically, telos is the purpose or the end that humans are placed on earth to acheive. Yet, as Macintyre writes "Every activity, every enquiry, every practice aims at some good" ("Aristotle's Account of the Virtues" 148). This good is defined as something human beings aim for ("Aristotle's Account of the Virtues" 148). Aristotle gives the good the name eudaimonia. Aristotle defines eudaimonia as the state of being well and doing well ("Aristotle's Account of the Virtues" 148). Therefore, Macintyre points out the tension between Aristotle's telos and the good (eudaimonia) as whether they are the same or different.

Virtues, as explained by Macintyre, are neccessary to acheive eudaimonia and affect reaching telos. Virtues are qualities that are used to achieve the highest human happiness. And so, the highest good for humans is happiness. Therfore, as humans aim for some end or purpose, achieving eudaimonia is equivalent to reaching telos.

In the modern world today, the idea of eudaimonia being equivalent to telos is achieving a career goal such as becoming a doctor. If one person sets his/her goal in life to becoming a doctor, then when the goal is reached that person achieves both telos and eudaimonia. Since the person sets becoming a doctor as a goal in life, it is the same as telos. At the same time, the person reaches eudaimonia. Being a doctor can mean financially doing well and morally doing well. Since doctors tend to have high salaries, they are financially doing well. Also, they help cure people's illnesses so they are morally well. So finally, they have reached eudaimonia both financially and morally. As Macintyre would say "what constitutes the good for man is a complete human life lived at its best" ("Aristotle's Account of the Virtues" 149).

Macintyre's argument about the telos and eudaimonia is sound. Aristotle does not explain whether a telos and eudaimonia can be equivalent. Although some of his arguments do support this theory, Aristotle separately defines both telos and eudaimonia. Can this have for people to decide? Or is it a different reason?

"The price for Justice is always paid by someone else"

Alasdair Macintyre hits at one of the most fundamental structural issues of Aristotle’s moral theory in his chapter on “Justice as Virtue: Changing Conceptions”, in his book After Virtue. He begins by discussing the way in which one attains virtue, “… a disposition or sentiment which will produce in us an obedience to certain rules” (Justice 244), by following a predetermined set of rules. However, “an agreement on what the relevant rules are to be is always a prerequisite for agreement upon the nature and content of a particular virtue” (244). As Macintyre demonstrates in his early example of citizens A and B, both may have the same concept of the virtue of Justice, however their application of the rules of attaining such virtue are much different. One can infer the overall basic thesis of this chapter is that one’s idea of a virtue, in this chapter, Justice, is comprised of their supposed rules in attaining said virtue. As Macintyre goes on to discuss, this leads to many different viewpoints of Justice.

Macintyre goes on to give the example of citizen A and Citizen B in a society. Each has a view of what the virtue justice means to them. To put it in lay man’s terms, (the non-philosophic like me), these ideas have been formed as a result of their everyday experiences and what they have come to know to be true. In the case of Citizen A, he has worked hard to earn his living, and needs the monetary rewards of his hard work to help put his child through college or whatever the case may be. He see’s Uncle Sam’s high taxation to give to those who, in his mind, do not work as hard, as an injustice. Citizen B on the flipside see’s the injustices of society on those of the impoverished and sees the governments aid of those people as true justice. In each example, the virtue of Justice is different, based off of what each person’s experiences have been for them.

As these examples put forth by Macintyre are excellent examples of the differences in the “Rules” as he says in attaining a virtue, justice, I believe this is not the heart of his argument. “Moral Philosophy reflects the debates and disagreements of the cultures so faithfully, that it’s controversies turn out to be unsettled in just the way that the political and moral debates themselves are” (Justice 252). The overall premise of this chapter, “Justice as Virtue: Changing Conceptions”, is that our society cannon hope to achieve “moral consensus” (252). “Too many disparate and moral concepts… No way of settling the issues between them rationally” (252).

He even invokes the beliefs of two previous philosophers, Rawls and Nozick. He goes on to discuss how each of there respective viewpoints and how Rawls deals with the ‘veil of ignorance’ and Nozick deals with the ‘Principle of distributive justice of entitlement’. However one common snag continues to hang in the way, the ‘incommensurable weighing of claims’. In both examples of the aforementioned philosophers, both place the individual first, and society secondary, as Macintyre puts it, “Shipwrecked on an Island”.

What he comes to conclude is that there can be no moral consensus. Governments in societies are simply just a “reflection of the extent to which our conflicts need to be suppressed” (254), and the government does not represent or express the Morals of the community of citizens.

Wednesday, February 17, 2010

Justice vs. Injustice

Aristotle claims that there are various attributes of justice and injustice. He states that justice is defined by being both lawful and just, and that injustice is quite the opposite. However, it seems strange that many of the definitions he gives of both justice and injustice overlap. For example, Aristotle says that “an act of injustice and a just act are defined by the voluntary and the involuntary” (Nicomachean Ethics 79). He further confuses me by saying that “actions are involuntary, then, if they are done in ignorance; or they are not done in ignorance, but they are not up to the agent; or they are done by force” (79). These two statements baffle me. Firstly, Aristotle is stating that an act of injustice and an act of justice are both defined by the same factors. How, then, are we supposed to differentiate one from the other? And, if Aristotle’s second statement bears truth, then how are we supposed to distinguish between the meanings of voluntary and involuntary acts? Aristotle does explain that individuals act on both involuntary and voluntary actions, however his characterization of what defines voluntary acts seems unclear. Aristotle states that “in some of our voluntary actions we act on a previous decision, and in some we act without previous decision. We act on a previous decision when we act of previous deliberation, and we act without previous decision when we act without previous deliberation” (79). If we can act voluntarily with both previous deliberation or absolutely no previous thought at all, how can we characterize both as being voluntary?

Aristotle addresses the question, “is it sometimes voluntary and sometimes involuntary” that we suffer injustice? Aristotle explains that there is a difference between suffering injustice and doing injustice. He explains that no one can truly suffer an injustice willingly. Aristotle also states, that “the same question arises about receiving justice. Since doing justice is always voluntary (as doing injustice is), is it reasonable for the same opposition to apply in both cases, so that both receiving justice and suffering injustice will be either alike voluntary or alike involuntary” (81). In my point of view, it seems that receiving justice or suffering injustice will be unknown, for it does not seem that in lifelike circumstances, we receive justice or suffer injustice knowingly, but rather accordingly. As Aristotle claims, “part of the politically just is natural, and the other part legal” (78). As Aristotle states, there are three kinds of injustices made: mistakes, misadventures and injuries. Injustice done out of ignorance is an inaccuracy, injustice done because something went wrong is an accident, and injustice done without previous deliberation is hurt.

What I found to be prominent in this segment was that Aristotle explains that justice is not only defined by being loyal to the law. Laws are part of defining what is and is not just, but there is a natural component that is far more complex. Exhibiting true will lead to true justice. Individuals who lack this virtue are blinded from seeing what is truly just. It is a natural characteristic that some inhibit.

Monday, February 8, 2010

With a Little Help From My Friends

In Book 8, chapters 2 through 11, Aristotle delves into the third essential when it comes to happiness; friendship. More specifically, Aristotle points out, there are different kinds of friendships as we may be well aware. On the one hand, there are friendships that are founded out of need or utility—that is—one person benefiting from someone else as they provide “goods or pleasures”, with this type of friendship considered to be incomplete (Friendship, 121). On the other hand, there are friendships based out of “goodwill” and in this friendship “each of them loves what is good for himself and repays in equal measure the wish and the pleasantness of his friend; for friendship is said to be equality. And this is true above all in the friendship of good people” (125). This is because there is no superiority-inferiority relationship in this friendship. According to Aristotle, the goodwill and sharing friendship is the one that best exemplifies virtue because it is complete—both parties involved are sending and receiving goods, there is no imbalance. In this complete friendship, there is no slander because there is the element of trust in this “true” friendship (124).

What would you think if I sang out of tune—would you stand up and walk out on me? According to Aristotle, you would because this type of friendship is “easily dissolved…for if someone is no longer pleasant or useful, the other stops loving him” (121). If you were friends with this person “coincidentally”, let’s say you found them pleasant because of their singing voice. Because the voice of the person is “no longer pleasant” (121), this friendship based out of coincidence would most certainly dissolve, for the “beloved (in this case the singer) is loved not insofar as he is who he is, but insofar as he provides some good or pleasure” (121). This is the reason why Aristotle insists that “base people will be friends for pleasure or utility” (124) because this is an incomplete friendship, and thus could not possibly contribute to happiness because happiness is about living a complete life; something that is incomplete could not lead to complete happiness. Could an incomplete jigsaw piece, one that is torn and broken or fake complete a jigsaw puzzle? Absolutely not, because the picture would be incomplete. So in a way, friendship and virtue are connected because it takes two people of virtuous character to form a friendship which in of itself is virtuous, which in turn leads to completeness which then leads to happiness.

My question to Aristotle is this; if friendship and virtue are in fact similar in a way, then can there be an excess and deficiency in friendship? I believe Aristotle would agree that there can be a deficiency in friendship, insofar as having no friends would in fact be a deficiency. As far as excess, he believes “complete friendship like erotic passion is like an excess” but its “naturally directed” at someone else (125) so thus because its natural, it is like a bodily need, therefore there cannot be a negative excess such as rashness with respect to bravery, or gluttony with respect to temperance.

Incontinence Made Me Do It

Book seven (chapters 1-10) of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics discusses the characteristics of Incontinence. He first begins by determining whether an incontinent person has knowledge. Aristotle mentions that Socrates believed that an incontinent person could not have knowledge, but is driven by ignorance. However, an incontinent person pursues an action even when he knows it is wrong to pursue it. For example, an incontinent person would know that it is wrong to steal, but does so anyway in the moment that he does the deed. Aristotle asserts that the knowledge that an incontinent person has is comparable to the knowledge that a drunk or a person who is affected by strong feelings would have because they “have knowledge in a way and do not have it.”(Nicomachean Ethics 103)

Next Aristotle differentiates between two different kinds of incontinence, one is of the appetite and the other is of the spirit. Incontinence of the spirit means that a person is overcome by reason whereas a person who is incontinent about appetite is not overcome by reason but by gratification. A person who is incontinent about the spirit would be a person who pursues an action through faulty reasoning, such as a person who is overeager to help a friend, but because of his over, eagerness does not fully hear or understand the instructions given and thus becomes more a hindrance than a help.

Incontinence is therefore caused by an inability to “abide” by some force that would make a person give in to an action that is known to be wrong. A continent person is one who withstands the base desire and does not go against a belief or knowledge of what is known to be wrong. Aristotle’s main argument is to connect incontinence with intemperance, which was why it is important to first clarify that an incontinent person has knowledge. Both intemperance and incontinence, along with temperance and continence, deal with pleasure and pain. However, the incontinent person and the intemperate person will pursue a pleasure when it is wrong for different reasons. An incontinent person purses a pleasure when it is wrong, even when he is aware that the action is wrong, whereas an intemperate person does not view the action as wrong. Therefore, Aristotle views the intemperate person as worse than the incontinent person because the intemperate person has no reason to pursue the pleasure. They pursue pleasure simply for the gratification of the result. An incontinent person will have a reason caused by a base desire that they are unable to withstand. To clarify the example given earlier of stealing, an incontinent person would steal, let us say a new PS3, the person knows that stealing is wrong, but steals the item because the desire of the PS3 is greater than that of the knowledge that stealing is wrong. I believe Aristotle would say that the intemperate person would be the kleptomaniac that steals the PS3, not because of any great desire for it, but simply because the action of stealing itself is the pleasure.

The converse of this is not the same, since the temperate person is better than the continent person is because the temperate person has no base desires to overcome and sees no pleasure in the excess of things.

Thursday, February 4, 2010

Virtue and Judgment: How is There Justice?

A basic understanding of Virtue as defined in Nicomachean Ethics shows that virtue is enacted through actions. The question of concern in book III is whether that action is voluntary or involuntary and what this means in the judgment of virtue. Involuntary actions are those that are forced, and therefore since the agent of action really contributed nothing to the actions being done we have a hard time assigning virtue. Deciding whether an action is voluntary or involuntary becomes a little more convoluted when someone has a choice, but because of external conditions one is practically left without a choice. For example telling a lie to save your mother, you have a choice to tell the truth but in reality you are forced to tell the lie because of the external condition of saving your mom.

So how does one choose what good justifies what evil? On one end of the spectrum it seems that everything can be qualified as forced, for example one can say in defense of stealing, that he did it to feed his family, he was forced to engage in the evil in order to provide for his family, is it justified? This is the stream of logic that Aristotle poses. The question that I pose however, is where do you draw the line, in a separate but similar example one could say that he was forced by the promise of pleasure to steal the stereo. How can any action be qualified as virtuous since almost everything that one does has an ulterior motive which can justify to a certain extent any action. This is why I believe that justice could not be based off of this ethics system, all that one would have to prove is that they had sufficient reason to do what they did and then they would walk, how do you judge what is sufficient reason.

This predicament is furthered when Aristotle brings ignorance to the picture, our justice system states that ignorance does not free someone from judgment, I think that this is necessary for establishing a justice system because how would you assign justice when anyone could simply claim ignorance in their defense. However I see the reasoning as to why the consideration of ignorance in assigning judgment, might be necessary. What if someone truly was ignorant of the fact that what they are doing is wrong and not virtuous, what if everyday John Doe goes outside and sprinkles rice around his yard for the birds to eat, he thinks that he is doing something virtuous but in reality the birds eat the rice and die when it expands in their stomach. Is he guilty? I don’t know.

He says that actions in response to appetite or spirit or spur of the moment actions are voluntary and should be included when judging virtue, but they are not a decision. Decision as Aristotle defines it is what I believe to be the most solid evidence of judging virtue, the decisions that one makes especially those that are heavily deliberated over are the most solid pieces of evidence to ones character. I believe this to be true because in my opinion to make a decision after deliberating over it, one has taken into account all of the possibilities that the outcome could be, this forces one to dig deep into his beliefs and decided whether or not he is going to follow these beliefs and since this decision is not rushed he has had time to research what he is going to decide so as not to be ignorant.

Maybe pleasure isn't so bad afterall...

Book seven (chapters 11-14) of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics addresses the controversial topic of pleasure. Aristotle quickly points out that there are multiple views and opinions regarding pleasure as either good or bad. All three of the views provided by Aristotle hold the belief that pleasure cannot be wholly good or good at all. Aristotle states the reason for these beliefs as “Every pleasure is a perceived becoming toward [the fulfillment of something’s] nature, but no becoming is of the same kind as its end.” (Nicomachean 114) As shown by the passage, Aristotle critiques other philosophers for seeing pleasure as a process as opposed to an activity. For example, watching movies can bring us pleasure, but seeing a movie does not ultimately bring us to some final state.

Chapter twelve continues by discussing pleasure’s ultimate relation to good or bad. Aristotle believes things can be good or bad either without qualification or specifically to the person or thing. This statement points out that there are different kinds of pleasures we pursue depending on our current state and Aristotle points out we seek different pleasure depending on whether our nature is being refilled or is has already been fully restored. Aristotle finally states “…pleasures are not becomings, nor do they all even involve a becoming. They are activities, and an end [in themselves] and arise when we exercise [a capacity], not when we are coming to be [in some state].” (Nicomachean Ethics 115) While some pleasures can be perceived as “bad” (ie: those that are pleasant without qualification), pleasure comes naturally as we fulfill the desires of our nature in an unimpeded manner. Pleasure does not bring us to a final end, but pleasure is an end in itself by satisfying our natural appetites.

So where does pleasure fit in the ultimate goal of happiness? To examine this we must first believe that pleasure can be the best good. Aristotle points out everyone can agree pain is an evil and should be avoided. If something is not bad and should not be avoided then it must be good just as pleasure must be a good (in the circumstances we are seeking a good pleasure). Does this mean that the best good might be some kind of pleasure? Aristotle gives the example that if each state has an unimpeded activity which is happiness then this activity surely would be the best choice. By exercising this choice (unimpeded) we are pursuing an activity which we defined earlier as pleasure. By pursuing this “good” pleasure (an unimpeded activity) we ultimately arrive at happiness. All animals and beings pursue pleasure to a certain extent which only shows it must be the best good, but we must keep in mind we all have different natures and states which account for differences in what we consider pleasurable.

Aristotle’s final point concerns bodily pleasures and how people often associate such pleasure with intemperate people. Bodily pleasures are good up to a point, but the danger comes from the notion that we can have an excess of bodily pleasures. We can enjoy bodily pleasures such as sex in a temperate manner, but some people enjoy sex in excess and such behavior projects intemperance. So why do we pursue these pleasures to excess? According to Aristotle, bodily pleasures mask pain and the excess of bodily pleasure serves as a cure or remedy to those things that bring us pain. Other people lack pleasure in other area of their lives and compensate by seeking bodily pleasures because their natural condition simply is painful to them. Abusers of pleasure aside, pleasure with no pain has no excess such as the pleasure from learning. To sum up, some pleasures are good or bad depending on why they are pleasurable to us. To say the pursuit of pleasure is bad contradicts the pursuit of happiness because to complete the ultimate end of happiness we much satisfy the desires of our natural state in an unimpeded manner a.k.a the pursuit of pleasure. We all have different natures so naturally we all have different pleasures. Some pleasures can be taken to excess such as bodily pleasures, but this does not mean bodily pleasures are bad.

Monday, February 1, 2010

Individual Virtues of Character: Bravery

In Book III of his renowned philosophical work Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes several distinctions regarding the individual character virtue of bravery. Primarily, he attempts to differentiate between the genuine virtue of bravery and conditions and circumstances in which only the appearance of bravery exists.

First, Aristotle, who considers bravery as the mean between feelings of fear and confidence (Nicomachean 40), acknowledges that even a brave person must feel fear simply because he or she is human. One who does not fear such things as a bad reputation or poverty and sickness, for example, clearly cannot be considered brave, rather they are disgraceful. A truly brave person, however, is one who is able to stand firm against his or her fears, or any frightening conditions, with rationality and confidence “for the right end, in the right way, at the right time” (Nicomachean 41). Consequently, the main focus of the brave person, according to Aristotle, is to aim for the “fine,” or what is itself beautiful (kalos) and deserving of admiration (Nicomachean 328), because “to the brave person bravery is fine; hence the end it aims is also fine” (Nicomachean 41). This is always true of a genuinely virtuous action.

This characteristic is what distinctly separates bravery from the extreme conditions of rashness and cowardice. A rash, excessively fearless person is someone who merely puts on the facade of a brave person, but in actuality could never confront the frightening conditions that a brave person could. In other words, they are all talk and no action. On the other hand, a coward, someone who is excessively afraid, lacks the proper confidence to ever achieve bravery. Even though bravery, rashness, and cowardice all revolve around the same issue, Aristotle believes they have “different states” (Nicomachean 42). Only bravery has the right state needed to perform a brave action.

Aristotle also presents many circumstances that appear similar to bravery, but in fact are not examples of genuine bravery. For instance, he describes how the bravery of citizens seeks to avoid reproach and desire honor, which is something fine, but it is still does not involve doing something for its own sake (Nicomachean 43), therefore, it is not genuine. In addition, he mentions how a professional soldier’s experience and familiarity in wartime can be confused with bravery, however, “they turn out to be cowards whenever the danger overstrains them” (Nicomachean 43). He goes on to explain how hopefulness, spirit, and ignorance can be confused with bravery as well. None of these conditions, however, exemplify genuine bravery because they do not possess the correct intentions or end. Genuine bravery must aim solely at the fine and cannot be achieved through any other motivation or condition.

If I could propose a question to Aristotle I would want to know if he believes that a brave person could help another person to become brave. Aristotle would probably respond by saying that since bravery is a virtue of character, we can only acquire it by ourselves through habituation. People cannot simply learn how to perform brave actions from someone else because it requires our own internal self, not anyone else.