Monday, February 22, 2010

"The price for Justice is always paid by someone else"

Alasdair Macintyre hits at one of the most fundamental structural issues of Aristotle’s moral theory in his chapter on “Justice as Virtue: Changing Conceptions”, in his book After Virtue. He begins by discussing the way in which one attains virtue, “… a disposition or sentiment which will produce in us an obedience to certain rules” (Justice 244), by following a predetermined set of rules. However, “an agreement on what the relevant rules are to be is always a prerequisite for agreement upon the nature and content of a particular virtue” (244). As Macintyre demonstrates in his early example of citizens A and B, both may have the same concept of the virtue of Justice, however their application of the rules of attaining such virtue are much different. One can infer the overall basic thesis of this chapter is that one’s idea of a virtue, in this chapter, Justice, is comprised of their supposed rules in attaining said virtue. As Macintyre goes on to discuss, this leads to many different viewpoints of Justice.

Macintyre goes on to give the example of citizen A and Citizen B in a society. Each has a view of what the virtue justice means to them. To put it in lay man’s terms, (the non-philosophic like me), these ideas have been formed as a result of their everyday experiences and what they have come to know to be true. In the case of Citizen A, he has worked hard to earn his living, and needs the monetary rewards of his hard work to help put his child through college or whatever the case may be. He see’s Uncle Sam’s high taxation to give to those who, in his mind, do not work as hard, as an injustice. Citizen B on the flipside see’s the injustices of society on those of the impoverished and sees the governments aid of those people as true justice. In each example, the virtue of Justice is different, based off of what each person’s experiences have been for them.

As these examples put forth by Macintyre are excellent examples of the differences in the “Rules” as he says in attaining a virtue, justice, I believe this is not the heart of his argument. “Moral Philosophy reflects the debates and disagreements of the cultures so faithfully, that it’s controversies turn out to be unsettled in just the way that the political and moral debates themselves are” (Justice 252). The overall premise of this chapter, “Justice as Virtue: Changing Conceptions”, is that our society cannon hope to achieve “moral consensus” (252). “Too many disparate and moral concepts… No way of settling the issues between them rationally” (252).

He even invokes the beliefs of two previous philosophers, Rawls and Nozick. He goes on to discuss how each of there respective viewpoints and how Rawls deals with the ‘veil of ignorance’ and Nozick deals with the ‘Principle of distributive justice of entitlement’. However one common snag continues to hang in the way, the ‘incommensurable weighing of claims’. In both examples of the aforementioned philosophers, both place the individual first, and society secondary, as Macintyre puts it, “Shipwrecked on an Island”.

What he comes to conclude is that there can be no moral consensus. Governments in societies are simply just a “reflection of the extent to which our conflicts need to be suppressed” (254), and the government does not represent or express the Morals of the community of citizens.

10 comments:

Wajamo said...

This is the single greatest blog post of all time, I agree with everything that is said here. Way to go Mark! I believe as well that there is no real universal moral consensus, different people have different ideals and different variables which in turn guide their morals. Whatever their morals, it is not up for another person, who does not see how they do, to judge them because of them.

Rosa Jiminian said...

Hi Mark,
I agree with you that Macintyre demonstrates the similarities of what both citizen A and B consider justice via their application of attaining the justice of virtue. However, I don’t agree that Macintyre interprets their sense of justice as coming from their experiences. In fact a huge portion of the philosopher’s chapter concerned what A and B thought they deserve and didn’t deserve. This “desert” is what was precisely lacking from Rawls and Nozick’s philosophies. I think it is also necessary to point out the fact that Macintyre never states that justice is not a moral consensus nor does he attempt to define it. He believes “that modern politics cannot be a matter of genuine moral consensus; and it is not” (251).Therefore, there cannot be a moral consensus because that is not what justice is. In general, Macintyre’s argument concentrated on what were not correct notions of justice, derived from our modern conception of individualism (hence the structure of today's governments and societies).

Mary Layden said...

When you say that A and B both "may have the same concept of the virtue of Justice" I disagree with this statement. If they can obtain virtue through justice, yet the laws set forth to maintain justice are contradictory to what they believe is just, they will not share the same concept of the virtue of Justice. At any given time the law will contradict one of their viewpoints, compelling one to see no virtue in Justice, because in their eyes, the law is no longer just and encourages them to act in a way that they see as not virtuous. While I agree that they differ in what they see as just, both A and B will never fully feel that Justice is being served at the same time, therefore altering when they see virtue in the law.

Amy Rosenberg said...

When I originally read Mark’s post I understood his assertion that A and B “may have the same concept of the virtue of Justice,” to mean that both A and B may both believe in the virtue of Justice, but have differing views on the definition of justice. I agree with Mary that A and B will never agree on the same definition of justice in terms of political issues. But, perhaps they can share the same belief of virtue of Justice, but disagree on the exact definition of justice? Ultimately, I believe that it is possible for certain A and B citizens to agree on what constitutes justice in some situations, but this will rarely occur.

Grant said...

Good Post Mark! I like how you broke Macintyre down into "lay man's terms" - appreciated. I like how he says that the virtue of justice is different based off of what each person's experiences have been for them. Do you believe this? I like how this challenges the notion of universal justice, which I feel that we in the United States and most other countries try to assign and I dont really agree with. However the inevetible scenario comes up. If I kill somebody so long as I see it fit to do so? Is it ok?

Joe Lama said...

I like your post, Mark. It’s easy to read, and it gives clear explanations as to your interpretation of the reading. This is where I have a slight disagreement with you. I agree with Rosa, when she says that the “desert” of each “citizen” is an essential element to these philosophies. This interpretation changes the focus and sparks another debate. What each man thinks they deserve is the entire fiber of the debate. Citizen A thinks he deserves all of his money. Citizen B thinks he deserves the right to food, shelter, and water. These conceptions of justice are very different, and I think these differences stretch from the belief/disbelief in the notion “all people are created equally.” Aristotle didn’t think that people were created equally, so his philosophy leans one way. Arguably the most important document of our country says that we are all created equally, so many of us would lean a different way. However, in this way, I do agree with you, Mark. I don’t think that government expresses the community’s moral ideals.

Mike Diaz said...

Hey Mark, good post. I too really enjoyed your example of the ways two people can view justice in the world. I find myself a little confused however with the line regarding culture and Moral Philosophy. If I understand correctly this line is saying our morals and what we believe to be just comes from the way our culture shapes us. Then at the end of your post you state that there can be no moral consensus. Do you think this means there can be no global moral consensus or within a government's own country?

Maryellen said...

I found Macintyre's article to be one of the most interesting things we've read in class so far. When striving to understand Aristotle and follow his logic it's easy to limit the definations of certain words like "justice." This article encouraged me to think about how justice is carried out in society. My guess is that just as most of us have a basic understanding of justice, our opinions as to what is just in certain situations would vary. I think this can be said of both citizen A and B. They both realize that justice is a virtue, but have conflicting understandings of how justice should be executed in society. Mark, you mention it is A and B's experiences that shape their understanding of what is just. I think that this is true and I think it is interesting to consider citizens A and B's positions in society. If citizen B had a substantial income and did not need monetary support, and was therefore in the same position as citizen A, would he or she change his/her position on justice? And the same if citizen A found himself in citizen B's shoes one day. Perhaps if roles were reversed the individuals' ideas about how justice should be carried out in society would suddenly change. I think both A and B have valid ideas about the enactment of justice and I understand both of their points. My answer to this predicament is that food, water, and shelter are essential to justice. People with more money should make sure that the poor do not go unprovided for in these ways. Then, those who work hard are entitled to the fruits of their labor, so long as everyone has the means to exist.

VTang said...

I think that the 'weighing of claims' that you and the reading mentioned is a crucial part in why both Rawls' and Nozick's accounts aren't considered to be completely accurate. From how I understood Macintyre's words, Macintyre goes against Rawls' account by saying that if only individuals 'situated behind a veil of ignorance' can choose certain principles of justice, then in order for there to be justice, everyone else in society would have to be 'situated behind a veil of ignorance' which isn't possible. This, I think is the imbalance that exists in Rawls' account that supports the idea that 'our society cannot hope to achieve moral consensus.'

Natalie Amato said...

Mark,
I agree that the main point of McIntyre's argument is that there is no way that all society can achieve a universal consensus of what virtue is. No matter how many people agree with a certain side, there will always be someone who disagrees and battles the other's argument. I think that this is very similar to what Aristotle says about the mean. He also says taht because people are so different and act differently to pleasures and pains. Even though McIntyre seems to disagree with Aristotle on a number of issues, the idea that universitality doesn't exist is present in both of these philosophers arguments.