Tuesday, March 30, 2010

Duty-free?

Kant expresses his beliefs regarding ethical duties to others in 448-461 of Metaphysics of Morals. Kant outlines his theories about what duties individuals have to others. Kant begins by stating that duties are divided into two categories, “duties to others in which one’s performance at the same time obligates them, and duties whose observance does not entail that obligation of other people” (Metaphysics of Morals 448). Throughout the remainder of this section, he relates multiple duties to these two categories.
Kant states his definitions of love and respect to further establish the premise for his argument. He defines love as “the maxim of benevolence; and this maxim results in beneficence”, and he defines respect as, “the maxim that limits our self-esteem by the dignity of humanity” (449). He distinguishes that the duty of love is a mutual exchange because it requires the other person to help the initiator benefit as well. In contrast, the duty of respect is one-sided; an individual exercising the duty of respect obligates only their self (450). Kant proceeds to analyze the duties of love, which include the duties of: beneficence, gratitude, and sympathy.
In describing the duty of beneficence, Kant makes an assertion that I disagree with. He states, “For every man who finds himself in need wishes that he might be helped by other men” (453). Kant asserts that if an individual states that they are not willing to help others in need, individuals have a right to not help them when they are in need. I agree with Kant that it is the duty of all men to be beneficent. However, I do not believe that every person in need wants to be helped by other men. I believe that there are many people in need who do not want the help of others. For example, many drug addicts, alcoholics, and individuals with eating disorders try to avoid the help of others. In many cases, these individuals realize they have a problem, but do not want to confront it. When reading this section, I wondered what Kant would say about individuals who avoid the help of others. Would Kant say that these individuals are excused from their duty to help others, until they get there own problems sorted out? I think that Kant would say that under certain conditions, individuals may be excused from their obligation to others due to their inability to help others as a result of their own problems. I believe that Kant would say that individuals are still required to uphold their duty to help these impaired people overcome their problems.

Monday, March 29, 2010

The End

This idea of duty, according to Kant, is necessary to achieve purpose in ones life. He claims that duty is not to have any constraint, except that of self- constraint (380). By this it seems that Kant believes humans are natural beings easily led astray, not always following the correct path, the path to duty. The doctrine of duties, which Kant uses to explain the “capacity and resolved purpose to resist an unjust opponent” (380) is an all encompassing doctrine, in a sense it explains how we should lead a good life. Within this broader sense, there are lesser doctrines such as the doctrine of virtue, which brings about internal freedoms under the laws. However, with each duty, there is an end. This end is achieved through our own thought.

Kant describes the end as an object of choice, by which the choice determines the object or the final outcome (381). There are two ways one can achieve this end, either by starting from the end to find the beginning or by starting from the beginning to find the end. The first is known as the doctrine of right, in the sense that the end is attained through free choice, while the latter way is known as ethics, where the “concept of duty” leads a man to find the proper end (382). In either case man cannot be forced to do what he does not want to.

It would seem that the ethical way of achieving an end would be the easiest and the most “correct.” One would only need to have a starting point and follow the concept of duty (i.e. perfecting oneself and/or making oneself morally happy (386)) in order to accomplish an end. However, by beginning from the end one as a much clearer understanding of how to fulfill the ultimate goal. It becomes much easier to map out a plan. By doing this one ensures that they follow the concepts of duty, never being led astray by natural means (380). As Kant says, an end is determined by free choice. “The representation of the end determines choice to an action whereby the object is produced” (385). Free choice: that is the key to the concept of duty and ends. Humans are rational natural beings, which allows us to be led from the correct path. Yet, because we are rational we have the chance to lead a good life by following the ends that correspond to duties.

Wednesday, March 24, 2010

Autonomy and Heteronomy

For Kant, when rational beings pursue morality and the kingdom of ends, they elevate themselves above the demands of nature and of their material circumstances. Thus, they establish the independence, or "autonomy," of their will (Groundwork 440). By contrast, when a person’s goals are determined by something other than universal law, their will is "heteronomous" in that it depends on external factors in determining its goals. Kant titles autonomy of the will as "the supreme principle of morality" and he describes heteronomy of the will as "the source of all spurious (fake) principles of morality" (440-441).

There have been philosophical systems that have made the mistake of advancing bases for morality that would in fact render the will heteronomous. Empirical principles (principles good with qualification) cannot be the basis of morality, because they are always heteronomous. Even when the goal is personal happiness, concerns about particular outcomes or courses of events can never have the status of universal laws of nature. Rational principles like the will of the divine are likewise heteronomous because they do not come from pure concepts of reason in that we have no notion of divine perfection other than that which we derive from our own moral concepts (443). Anytime someone does something in order to attain something else--whether that something else is happiness or perfection or the satisfaction of some physical need or desire--the person's will is determined by that something else; the will is heteronomous and the corresponding maxim of the action makes sense only in the particular and not as a universal law of nature. The basic idea that moral actions are undertaken for the sake of duty alone seems to be based on a notion of the autonomy of the will.

I have a problem with Kant’s position though because it seems too theoretical. Kant seems to think that reason is something that people can use to develop universal laws and moral principles. I feel that there are different ideas that make sense to people of different cultures. I'm thinking universal means universal to Kant and this is hard for me to grasp. Kant's notion of "autonomy" is either unclear or unlikely. Kant event admits that his notions of "autonomy" and of a "kingdom of ends" are concepts that we cannot be proven in real life but with pure practical reason. It makes sense to "Always choose in such a way that in the same volition the maxims of the choice are at the same time present as universal law" (440). However, I find this difficult to accomplish.

Monday, March 22, 2010

Preservation of Our Animal Nature

Kant discusses the duty of a man to himself as the “preservation of himself in his animal nature” (Groundwork 421). In this section, Kant proposes many ways of destructing one’s animal nature; suicide, self-mutilation, using one’s body in a sexual way not intended for reproduction, drunkenness, gluttony and “stupefying agents” such as opium and other products of the plant kingdom (427). Kant makes the case that suicide is a crime --it is not only a violation of one’s duty to other men (or other duties such as that of a spouse, a father, or a citizen) but most importantly it is a violation of the duty to oneself (422). Kant claims that “a man is still obligated to preserve his life simply because he is a person and must therefore recognize a duty to himself” (422).

While the righteousness or lack thereof of suicide is a common theme in literature, plays, religion and other influential aspects of society, Kant identifies another form of destruction of one’s animal nature, and that is the act of self-mutilation. Kant believes that when one “deprives himself of certain integral parts by dismembering or mutilating himself” he is guilty of partial destruction of one’s animal nature (421). Kant goes on to offer examples of “partial self-murder” such as giving away or selling a tooth so it can be planted in the jawbone of another person, or submitting oneself to castration in order to gain an easier livelihood as a singer (423). To me, this would imply that Kant regards all cosmetic surgery as self-mutilation, and therefore partial murder of oneself. Cosmetic surgery is widespread throughout today’s media, and very prevalent among celebrities. Kant takes an interesting stance on this issue; in one regard I don’t believe cosmetic surgery is such a huge deprivation of one’s nature, but in the way that it suggests one is not comfortable in one’s body, it does seem like an abandonment of the duty to preserve oneself.

Kant says that “this is not the case with the amputation of a dead organ” (423). This leads me to question how Kant would feel about live organ donation for a noble cause. For example,someone donating a kidney to a family member in order to save his or her life.In that case, is that still destruction of our animal nature and partial self-murder, even if it is completely selfless and has a noble cause? I believe that Kant would say no, because he says, “Where there is courage, there is always respect for the humanity in one’s own person.” If one is respecting the humanity in one’s own person, how can they be participating in partial self-murder at the same time? To say Kant would support this somewhat contradicts his previously stated position on replanting a tooth in another person’s jawbone but, because donating a live organ is not lack of respect for one’s body or one’s nature (instead, it is a courageous act to aid another) I believe that Kant would recognize the courage and respect for humanity in a live organ transport done for the sake of a noble cause. This would differ from surgery for the purposes of changing oneself for the sake of being accepted in society, or trying to improve one’s appearance or abilities. I think it’s safe to assume that Kant would not be a Michael Jackson fan,because he would regard his cosmetic alterations as partial destruction of self and “degrading the humanity in his person” (423).

Debbie Downer

In Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Immanuel Kant seeks to establish and define the supreme principle of morality. But his account of this moral principle in Section 2 leaves one feeling disheartened rather than feeling closer to being able to employ and achieve morality.

The moral law is one that can be applied universally, and therefore does not take into account experience, or circumstance--it is not situational. An act is to be judged moral through its intentions and not any of its consequences. In order for an action to be truly moral, its maxim must be solely based on the command of duty. He places morality on such a high pedestal admitting that “most of our actions are in conformity with duty” but when we examine their intentions we find that duty is not the only source driving the action, and therefore cannot be defined as moral (4:407-408).

He urges us not to rely on examples to understand morality because you cannot find “a single case in which the maxim of an action otherwise in conformity with duty rested simply on moral grounds and on the representation of one’s duty,” meaning that there is not one case where there is not some sort of egotistic driving force behind an action (Kant 4:407). Not only is this a negative view of human nature, but also who is he to judge every persons intentions? If a person finds a cell phone and returns it to the owner, refusing any compensation, does he have any selfish intentions or aspirations? And even if this person did accept compensation, who is to say that it was a driving force behind his decision to return the phone? Kant says that “imitation has no place at all in matters of morality,” but doesn’t this imitation of good and moral actions help enforce this tendency towards a moral principle (4:409)?

Kant creates this notion of morality that makes it near impossible for us to behave morally, or even recognize moral actions are being preformed. By having morality rest solely on reason and not experience, he might explain the principle of morality but at no point explains how we can come closer to reaching it. What good is understanding morality if we do not have the capacity of achieving it?

Thursday, March 11, 2010

Kant Find One

In this section of Groundwork, Kant continues his search for a law that can determine the will without reference to any expected effect—so the will can be called absolutely good without qualification. To find this law, Kant has stripped the will of any urge or compulsion that would come to light via the adherence of any particular law. Therefore, there are no developed/underlying principles, but the universal conformity of actions to serve as a societal standard. Kant believes that your actions should have the ability to be seen as a universal law, and conformity to the universal “serves the will as principle and must so serve it if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a chimerical concept.” (Groundwork, 14) By practicing conformity, man solidifies various principles/maxims that are perceived as good duties/laws. Kant emphasizes that humankind has always lived by this theory of ordinary reason and to prove it he poses this question. “When I am in distress may make a promise with the intention of not keeping it?” (Groundwork, 14) In other words would it be acceptable to make a lying promise in times of difficulty. Kant continues by discussing the two implications of this question that are: if making a false promise corresponds with prudence or duty. Prudence is the act of showing care and thought for the future and it plays a role in telling a false lie. Yet telling a false lie due to prudence is not clever because we will never know the full consequences of the lie. Kant states “even with all my supposed cunning; loss in confidence in me might prove to be far more disadvantageous than the misfortune which I now try to avoid.” (Groundwork, 14) The most sensible way to act would be through a universal maxim and not promise anything without intending to keep it. Kant then points out that there is a schism between truthfulness from duty and truthfulness from fear of disadvantageous consequences. Basically, truthfulness from duty is that the action contains a law for us, while in the latter one must weigh the ramifications that are connected with the action. Another keynote difference between them is that one can abandon the maxim of prudence.

Kant also believes that this question could be answered if the lying promise could hold as a universal not just for one person, but for others as well. Henceforth, can everyone make a promise they cannot keep? However a lying promise could not work for all because no one would be believed, and if someone did believe you they would pay you back in “like coin.” Kant stresses that one’s maxim should have the ability become a universal law, and if not it should be rejected—due to the fact that it would not hold as a possible legislation for universal law. By conforming to this universal, acting respectfully toward the practical law, and expunge our desires we define our duties. And we all know that duty is worth more than all-else. Kant then explores the difference between practical judgment and theoretical judgment and comes to the conclusion—wherein he opines that practical judgment is more favorable. Because, practical judgment is more certain than the thoughts of any philosopher.

In summation, Kant believes that ordinary human reason should leave its sphere and seek philosophy. He also stresses that peace is only attainable via thorough critical examination of our reason.

Tuesday, March 9, 2010

It is your duty! (to read this blog post)

In Groundwork, Kant delves into the concept of duty when he presents four cases and their relation to duty. First, Kant omits all actions that are contrary to duty, and while he never explicitly mentions examples, actions such as lying, cheating, or stealing certainly fall under this category. These actions not only conflict with the concept of duty, but contradict it as well. The second case involves actions that may align themselves in accordance with duty, yet one has no immediate inclination towards the action, and rather performs them for selfish motivations; motivations that, as Kant says, are easily recognizable. Kant sets aside these first two cases, because their actions are not done from duty or immediate inclination, and in the second case, is done for selfish reasons. The third case consists of actions that accord with duty, and where a person has an immediate inclination to such an action. An example of this would be someone who does not commit adultery because they love their spouse and sees them as the most desirable. The fourth case is when one’s actions accord with duty but are contrary to their immediate inclinations. An example of this would be someone who does not commit adultery even though they don’t desire their spouse, even when they turn out to be a horrible person. Ultimately, it is within cases three and four that Kant discusses different types of duties.

The first duty discussed is the duty to preserve one’s life. Kant states that this is a duty that everyone has an immediate inclination to and while one acts from this inclination it is often because of fear and therefore acts with no moral content (an example of case three). While in accordance with duty, they do not act from duty. If one wished for death, yet preserved life while not loving it, they would then be acting purely from duty and in this case would be acting with moral content (an example of case four). The second duty Kant addresses is the duty to be beneficent where one can. He states that one may find pleasure in acting beneficent towards another and truly find satisfaction from such an act. This act is then good and should be praised, but still has no moral worth. This is an example of case three, because while these actions are good and praise worthy, from them arises such things as the inclination of honor. While the inclination of honor, when done for what is beneficial to another, is within agreeance to one’s duty it still lacks moral content. Only if one had no inclination to be beneficent yet does so out of duty can have moral worth in their actions, which is an example of case four. The last duty discussed is one’s duty to secure one’s own happiness. In regards to this Kant says, “men already have, irrespective of duty, the strongest and deepest inclination toward happiness, because just in this idea are all inclinations combined in a sum total.” (Groundwork, 399) In this we see that of all inclinations happiness is the most innate inclination that we have, for which all others strive for. Kant also addresses that it is difficult for man to formulate one specific idea of what happiness is, so often times they are compelled toward one single inclination to produce satisfaction and happiness rather than achieving the universal happiness. If one were to choose to enjoy what makes them happy, and accept what suffering he may encounter as a result his actions he then is acting contrary to the universal inclinations to happiness. Therefore, in some regard, he is acting out of duty and is denying his inclinations and as a result contains moral worth in his action, which is in accordance with case four.

Ultimately it is seen that only actions done from duty, and not in accordance with duty has worth, in other words case four. Acting in accordance implies an action that is aimed at an end, and actions with such motives will never have moral worth. Kant writes, “From what has gone before it is clear that the purposes which we may have in our actions, as well as their effects regarded as ends and incentives of the will, cannot give to actions any unconditioned moral worth.” (Groundwork 400) Furthermore duty is performed out of respect for the law. Only the law can be a thing of respect and therefore can be an authority. It is with this in mind that Kant states that the only thing that can determine the will and that even if all of ones inclinations suggest otherwise one must accord with the law.

Sunday, March 7, 2010

Kant and the Idea of Good Will

In the first section of Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant begins his argument by indicating that there is absolutely nothing that “can be regarded as good without qualification, except a good will” (Kant 7). Unlike Aristotle (and the Ancient Greeks in general), Kant doesn’t think that any virtues (he calls them temperaments or character qualities) are good alone. Wealth, power, influence, or good fortune are also not good alone. All of these things require good will behind them as a qualification for judging them good. It is how such things are used that makes them good; and “unless there is a good will to correct their influence on the mind” and to keep these things in check with their proper and good purpose, then they cannot be good. Therefore, good will is an essential qualification for such things to be good, and good will is the only thing that can be considered good without any other qualifications. As Kant says, these things have “no intrinsic unconditional worth, but… always presuppose… a good will” (7).

However, Kant goes one step further and says that because a good will is the only thing that is good in itself, it is therefore also good because it is simply good in and of itself and not because it necessary affects anything else or accomplishes anything beyond being good in and of itself. He says, “… it is good only through its willing, i.e., it is good in itself” (7). This being established leads us to a tricky point. If just possessing a good will is good, and the good will is good itself without ever needing to consider its effects or accomplishments, then the person with a good will may never use his good will to accomplish anything and still be considered good. Kant says, “… if with the greatest effort, it should yet achieve nothing, and only the good will should remain,… yet would it, like a jewel, still shine by its own light as something which has its full value in itself” (8). This seems logical. It is certainly a logical conclusion. However, let’s think of it a bit differently. Say you were given the chance to own the Hope Diamond. With a few provisos. Under no conditions were you permitted to sell it, set it for wearing, or donate it to a museum. You were allowed to enjoy its beauty privately, but you would never be allowed to show it to anyone else. Would you want it? Wouldn’t we say that the beauty of the diamond is in the eye of the beholder? What if there weren’t any beholders? No one would see it and no one would ever know you had it.