In Groundwork, Kant delves into the concept of duty when he presents four cases and their relation to duty. First, Kant omits all actions that are contrary to duty, and while he never explicitly mentions examples, actions such as lying, cheating, or stealing certainly fall under this category. These actions not only conflict with the concept of duty, but contradict it as well. The second case involves actions that may align themselves in accordance with duty, yet one has no immediate inclination towards the action, and rather performs them for selfish motivations; motivations that, as Kant says, are easily recognizable. Kant sets aside these first two cases, because their actions are not done from duty or immediate inclination, and in the second case, is done for selfish reasons. The third case consists of actions that accord with duty, and where a person has an immediate inclination to such an action. An example of this would be someone who does not commit adultery because they love their spouse and sees them as the most desirable. The fourth case is when one’s actions accord with duty but are contrary to their immediate inclinations. An example of this would be someone who does not commit adultery even though they don’t desire their spouse, even when they turn out to be a horrible person. Ultimately, it is within cases three and four that Kant discusses different types of duties.
The first duty discussed is the duty to preserve one’s life. Kant states that this is a duty that everyone has an immediate inclination to and while one acts from this inclination it is often because of fear and therefore acts with no moral content (an example of case three). While in accordance with duty, they do not act from duty. If one wished for death, yet preserved life while not loving it, they would then be acting purely from duty and in this case would be acting with moral content (an example of case four). The second duty Kant addresses is the duty to be beneficent where one can. He states that one may find pleasure in acting beneficent towards another and truly find satisfaction from such an act. This act is then good and should be praised, but still has no moral worth. This is an example of case three, because while these actions are good and praise worthy, from them arises such things as the inclination of honor. While the inclination of honor, when done for what is beneficial to another, is within agreeance to one’s duty it still lacks moral content. Only if one had no inclination to be beneficent yet does so out of duty can have moral worth in their actions, which is an example of case four. The last duty discussed is one’s duty to secure one’s own happiness. In regards to this Kant says, “men already have, irrespective of duty, the strongest and deepest inclination toward happiness, because just in this idea are all inclinations combined in a sum total.” (Groundwork, 399) In this we see that of all inclinations happiness is the most innate inclination that we have, for which all others strive for. Kant also addresses that it is difficult for man to formulate one specific idea of what happiness is, so often times they are compelled toward one single inclination to produce satisfaction and happiness rather than achieving the universal happiness. If one were to choose to enjoy what makes them happy, and accept what suffering he may encounter as a result his actions he then is acting contrary to the universal inclinations to happiness. Therefore, in some regard, he is acting out of duty and is denying his inclinations and as a result contains moral worth in his action, which is in accordance with case four.
Ultimately it is seen that only actions done from duty, and not in accordance with duty has worth, in other words case four. Acting in accordance implies an action that is aimed at an end, and actions with such motives will never have moral worth. Kant writes, “From what has gone before it is clear that the purposes which we may have in our actions, as well as their effects regarded as ends and incentives of the will, cannot give to actions any unconditioned moral worth.” (Groundwork 400) Furthermore duty is performed out of respect for the law. Only the law can be a thing of respect and therefore can be an authority. It is with this in mind that Kant states that the only thing that can determine the will and that even if all of ones inclinations suggest otherwise one must accord with the law.
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I agree that the only acts of duty in accordance with moral worth are those that are not aimed at an end. It is only when our actions are done out of duty without any thoughts of gaining happiness or some benefit that we are doing the action as an ends and not as a means to an end. However, I have to question the idea that our duty must accord only with the law. To clarify, I mean that if the law calls for us to follow a law that is bad or that we perceive to be bad must we follow it? For example, if the government passed a law that harmfully targeted a group of people, would it still be our duty to follow the law. One scenario said that if we act in accordance to duty, solely out of duty, that then the act has moral worth. I do not think that this would be the case, but would acting against the law go against duty if it is for a perceived right? Is the law that we are acting against the only law which we have a duty to follow?
Well Kant's whole philosophy of duty and acting is based not on the outcome or consequences of an action but rather the reason behind the immediate action. In the case of the law that harmfully targets a group of people, Kant would not be concerned about the outcome of this law, or if as a result of this law it harmed them. Kant would say yes, it is your duty to follow the law if it has been reasoned into existence, universally, by rational beings.
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