Aristotle on Pleasure

According to Aristotle, there are two types of pleasure. Pleasure of the soul and pleasure of the body. Pleasure of the soul deals with study and honor while pleasure of the body deals with senses and condition, condition meaning touch and sense. When it comes to study there is no excess of pleasure. Honor may be something that you have too much pleasure in. Aristotle continues by claiming that pleasure is not a transformation of a state from one to another. Pleasure is a sign of our state, completes an activity. That is to say with every activity we complete we receive a type of pleasure. To connect pleasure to virtue, virtuous acts produce a type of pleasure that further enables us to act virtuous.
Along with being a sign of the state of our soul, pleasure is socially determined. A point that is very valid, even in modern day. What is seen as pleasurable will be defined by those around us. But the most valid point made by Aristotle is the fact that pleasures are not a process. They don't lead to our completeness, only happiness can lead to our completeness. Pleasures are merely accompany activities. With virtuous acts come pleasures and even though pleasures is not the most important aspect, it is essential because life in itself is an activity and since pleasures perfect our activities, they are essential to life.

The Rights and Wrongs of Warfare

In Thomas Nagel's War and Massacre Nagel discusses two different types of reasoning which are the Utilitarian and the Absolutist reasoning. Utilitarian reasoning deals with the ends of an action while Absolutist reasoning assesses the action itself. At the very beginning, it seems that the two are substitutes of each other where only either one is used in certain situations. But later on, we discover that Absolutist reasoning is actually a limitation of Utilitarian reasoning. The existence of these two is also the reason why we have dilemmas that we have to decide on. As Nagel says, there is nobody who completely neglects either reasoning when making a decision. This forces one to have to choose between the end and the action itself. For example, when one decides to rob a bank, he or she needs to decide between being able to feed his family or not stealing because it is not acceptable. Up until now, Utilitarianism aims to maximize good and minimize evil but it doesn't really discuss the means by which you maximize the good and minimize evil. This is where Absolutist reasoning comes in and tries to account for the lack of limitations in Utilitarianism by making the thinker consider the acceptability of his or her action while trying to maximize good and minimize evil.


Moving onto the absolutist restrictions in warfare, Nagel says that there are two types. One type is the restrictions on the manner of the attack. The second is the restrictions on the class of people at whom the aggression or violence may be directed. (Massacre 62) Before we make any acts of aggression or hostility, we need to first determine the true object that deserves this type of treatment. A scenario that can be used to explain these two restrictions would be a situation where someone is throwing grenades at someone else. The person being thrown at should only retaliate to the grenadier and not to anything else that the grenadier may be vulnerable. To distinguish whether an individual is the true object that is rightfully subject to these hostile acts, one must decide whether that individual is the one posing the threat to him or her. The grenadier in this scenario is the true object but the person who is providing the grenades to him is not rightfully subject to hostile treatments because he is not directly causing the harm. As for the restrictions on the manner of attack, there are acts of hostility that Nagel says are never permissible. These acts are the types that aim to "attack the men, not the soldier." (Massacre 70) What I took from this is that the impermissible acts are the ones that cause so much damage to someone to a point where they don't feel like a normal person anymore. So as Nagel says, using a flamethrower against someone is an absolute atrocity because it does so much permanent damage to someone. While Nagel was able to analyze the acceptability of certain acts during warfare, there are still many things that simply cannot be explained by just Utilitarian and Absolutist reasoning.

The Lack of Universal Utilitarianism

The Utilitarianism that Sedgwick advocates, is a philosophy which seeks the greatest happiness for the greatest amount of people, operating off of a morality system which is based off of a universal understanding or common sense morality. However he realizes in this section that “Humanity is not something that exhibit’s the same properties always and everywhere,” meaning that it is “Absurd to lay down a set of utilitarian rules for mankind generally.” I feel that Sedgwick, although he clearly realizes that this is an issue, belittles it by believing that even though Utilitarianism is not able to transcend different cultures or belief systems it can still work within a certain culture. He believes that we have our own “Societies morality,” and that when looking at others “We can realize imperfections.”

This is a problem however because in the modern world not only is there no universal common sense or common morality that can transcend culture, today there is not one uniform culture even within a defined geographical location. So nowhere can a Utilitarian world exist. In his writing he proposes a rather absurd idea, that if everybody was to be “Converted at once to utilitarianism and if everybody left behind there own old moralities, then it would work.” I agree with him on this point in both that it would work if it could ever be possible, and that it is completely unrealistic. There will never be a universal morality it is impossible even if we were all born into a culture of the same set of beliefs people are always going to challenge moralities that they are given, I think that Sedgwick belittles the significance of an individuals life experiences and individual beliefs in determining morality. Since no two people have the same experiences in life there will never be a universal common sense or universal morality.

I really like Mr. Stephens scientific take on morality, that the ultimate end is not happiness but instead preservation of oneself and the community. I like this not necessarily because I agree with it, but merely because it is such a different take on morality which I have never seen or thought of. Even when he speaks of common sense it can barely hold because if different societies have different values then common sense is going to change as well. If in my society there is an extreme shortage of water and to bring the rains we must sacrifice a cow and in another society cows are seen as holy and if you kill the cow you will have bad fortunes in this life and the next, then common sense is no doubt going to be varied. Also again even within our own cultures these contradictions will exist.

We're Not All Perfect

Sidgwick understands the natural flaws that we all have as human beings. These flaws can possibly prevent us from reaching our happiness and attain our Common Sense. These imperfections come from our intelligence and our sympathy.

For intelligence, “We must also allow further for the limitation of intelligence: for in all ages ordinary men have had a very inadequate knowledge of natural sequences; so that such indirect consequences as have been felt have been frequently traced to wrong causes, and have been met by wrong moral remedies, owing to imperfect apprehension of the relation of means to ends. (459)” We as humans do not have the best education in life on life experiences. We learn as we go. Thus, we have to make our mistake with intelligence in order to learn. Sidgwick believes that this type of education needs to be limited so that it does not affect our ability for proper Common Sense.

But in the end he believes that these imperfections are not really affecting his proof unless they happen in extremes. (459) Utilitarianism ideals still stand.

I think that Sidgwick is making a good argument in understanding our flaws as humans, but not using it as an excuse. We need to realize that we have these possible flaws. But, we have to control them so that we can work towards happiness.

So, Justice Can't be Universalized??

In John Stuart Mill’s digestion of the relationship between justice and utility, it is evident that the main point he is trying to make is that the notion of justice is not something that is not and never will be universalized. Mill states that the reason for this impossibility is that justice varies in different persons because we all have different notions of utility (Utilitarianism, 46). In other words, what we think is wrong or right, depends on what we each find to be pleasurable to us. Mill uses a very good example to illustrate this idea. His example of how the payment of taxes should be distributed amongst society members is actually an issue that is present even in today’s society. While some people think that it is unjust to tax the poor as much as the rich, others believe that it is only just to equally tax everybody. Which one, therefore, is really just? Mill purposely leaves this question unanswered because the answer purely depends on that person’s utility.

While Mill ultimately believes that social utility is the deciding factor of what is just, he highlights a few common grounds that must hold for everyone’s notion of justice at the beginning of the chapter. He names 5 “general rules” that universally hold when analyzing what is just/unjust: (1) “It is unjust to deprive anyone of his personal liberty, his property, or any other thing which belongs to him by law” (44), (2) Law is not the deciding factor for what justice is because there may exist “bad laws” (44), (3) “Each person should obtain that which he deserves” (45), (4) “It is unjust to break faith with anyone” (45), (5) “It is unjust to show favor or preference to one person over another in matters to which favor and preference do not properly apply” (45).

I found that the point Mill is trying to make is that we can determine if people are wrong or right depending on what we think they ought to be doing (49). However, it seems to me that Mill is contradicting himself when he says this because he previously outlines 5 universal guidelines that hold for justice. If we call people wrong based on what we think they ought to be doing, there is a possibility that others will not think the same way. It seems as though Mill transitions from talking about justice in a universal light to ending the chapter clearly denoting that justice is incapable of being universal because “justice bends to every person’s ideas of social expediency” (63).

Modern Constructivism

It’s a little late but, better late than never. Kant’s form of deontology can be seen as a kind of moral constructivism. According to Rawls, what Kant “constructs” is “the content of the doctrine”(3.2). This means that the universality of a particular categorical imperative that pass the laws of universality are considered to be constructed by “a procedure of construction worked through by rational agents subject to various reasonable constraints”(3.2). Kant believes that the procedure to construct these doctrines is not what is being constructed. This procedure, the categorical imperative procedure, is derived from our everyday understanding and our implicit awareness of the need for practical reason. Judgments made like this are not correct because the outcome is correct. These judgments are correct because the procedure and all the rational agents at work in the procedure make that outcome correct.

These thoughts have a basis which upon they work. The basis is that everyone is free, reasonable, and rational. With this basis in mind, the categorical imperative procedure can be followed to construct doctrines. Besides needing people to be both reasonable and rational, this categorical imperative procedure demonstrates that everyone is both reasonable and rational. We are rational in the beginning when we rationalize the procedure in order to follow it. We are reasonable because we are using the categorical imperative procedure to begin with. Rawls believes that Kant thinks that if we were not reasonable, we would not both to check our maxims against this procedure in order to see if it holds up to the law of universality (3.3). It also shows that we are reasonable when, if our maxim follows this procedure and is rejected by the law of universality, we go back and take an interest in trying to fix it.

I believe that this procedure is not as fixed as Kant would like to think it is. It only works when the person putting it to use is both rational and reasonable. I believe that this is a much harder thing to ask for humanity than Kant does. Kant simply assumes that all of humanity, with a few exceptions of course, are rational and reasonable beings. I do not believe that most of humanity is as reasonable and rational as Kant would like to think. Think about all the times that you have stopped and thought to yourself, “What was he thinking?” or “That really isn’t fair.” It happens quite a lot, does it not? Most of the time, thoughts like these are based on decisions other people made, decision where they were clearly not being reasonable or rational enough to use the procedure that Kant believes everyone naturally can and does use.

Virtue can be pleasurable....

In chapter four of Utilitarianism by John Stuart Mill, the philosopher explores the contention between desiring pleasure and desiring virtue. In order to do this he further defines the notion of happiness as “the only thing desirable as an end; all other things being desirable as a means to that end” (35). Does this mean morality is subsidiary to happiness? Mill answers this question by explaining that the relationship between virtue and vice correlate to the one between pleasure and pain. Virtue and pleasure are the equivalent because both are means for happiness, in the same manner that the absence of vice and pain lead to happiness. What’s even more controversial than this the idea that virtue and pleasure can be one in the same, is that in a person can desire virtue for itself (36). For example, I can desire virtuousness by becoming a nun for the sake of the virtues that type of life entails. Becoming a nun was the means to attaining virtue and therefore achieving happiness. According to Mill, anything that is desired for its own sake is craved for as a part of happiness (38). Desiring virtue is initially a means to happiness but can become a part of happiness as shown in the example above.

The contention between pleasures and virtue encompasses one of the susceptibilities for the proof of utility. Mill believes that it is a “physical and metaphysical impossibility” to desire things other than in proportion the pleasure it offers (39). This means that the only reason a person would desire virtue is because it offers some degree of pleasure. Even if leading a life of virtue means leading a life with less personal happiness. As the philosopher explains in previous chapters of this essay, the noble person is the best means to happiness because they sacrifice their own desires for the sake of a greater food. The notion of virtue is something that is different for every person. Does the doctrine of utility account for these different and sometimes even conflicting notions of virtuousness? For example, a pro-life activist believes virtue means preserving life at all cost. When a baby is conceived, abortion is an act of murder in this notion of virtue. However, a pro-choice activist believes virtue means sparing life for a greater good. When a sick a person is suffering, helping them pass on is the virtuous thing to under a pro-choice ideal. What is the greater good in this case? With which notion of virtue would the doctrine of utility agree with?

Where's the Proof, Sidgwick?

In this reading, Sidgwick defines Utilitarianism and tries to come up with the proof of Utilitarianism. Sidgwick puts forth that Utilitarianism is the conduct that “will produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole,” or greatest amount of happiness of all whose happiness is affected (408). In this manner, Sidgwick also defines the greatest happiness as the greatest possible surplus of pleasure over pain (409). In this definition, we can all see the inherent problem: it is hard to compare the pleasure and pains of different people/beings. How can we deny the happiness of one person over the happiness of another? To clarify this point, Sidgwick explains to make the number enjoying the happiness as great as possible, weighing happiness gained by the majority against happiness lost by the remainder. But does everyone’s happiness count equally? Sidgwick is with Bentham saying, “Everybody count for one and nobody for more than one” (412).
In the second chapter of this reading, Sidgwick looks to find the proof of Utilitarianism, asking the question, “Why should we live for the happiness of the greatest number and not just for our own happiness?” (414) This is a big problem that Sidgwick does not exactly answer. Admitting that Common Sense says that we should seek our own happiness, Sidgwick answers that “it cannot be proved that the difference between his own happiness and another’s happiness is not for him all-important” (416). To prove to an egoist that utilitarianism is superior would only be to make an egoist accept that utilitarianism is a mean to his end (his own happiness). In other words, the happiness of the greatest number will probably include his happiness; therefore, the egoist can accept this theory. The egoist believes that “nature designed him to seek his own happiness” to which Sidgwick responds that one person’s happiness cannot be a more important part of Good, universally, than the equal happiness of any other person. With all these problems with finding a proof, Sidgwick wants to find a synthesis that binds unconnected and conflicting principles of common moral reasoning into a complete and harmonious system (418). Sidgwick never really does this though. Sidgwick comes to a quick conclusion that common sense proves Utilitarianism. He concludes that the proof of Utilitarianism is that the morality of Common Sense is exhibits the Utilitarian principle that common sense naturally appeals to (418). In other words, common sense follows the conventions of Utilitarianism, so Utilitarianism must be true, given this proof.

No Universal Human Nature?? Say What?!?!

In his writings on ethics, entitled ethics Thomas Nagel discusses ethics. He starts out quite bluntly by saying that what he is about to write “will be very general and not very complete”, but that he hopes that it will prove that the enterprise of ethics is not hopeless. Nagel first defines four reasons for our morality. The first is autonomy, or the things that we do for ourselves, the second is obligation, or the special consideration that we have toward certain people in our lives, the third is neutral values, or universal values for the common good, and finally deontology, or the reasons that we treat other people decently.

His main argument is between the two extremes, autonomy and deontology. This argument boils down essentially to objectivity versus subjectivity. The subjectivity of autonomy, and one’s personal desires and appetites versus the objectivity of moral absolutes which help govern our actions. Nagel believes that we live within a delicate balance of the two. Our own personal desires for things that we want to do but have no real effect on the good of the world, must be balanced with the moral considerations of human nature. In general, Nagel would say that most people live within the confines of this balance, making sure that your appetites do not get in the way of your morality and that your morality does not keep you from getting what you need. For example, consider the overly good person who does not take bread that has fallen off of the back of a truck even on the verge of starvation. Or the counterexample of the sociopath who does not consider any morals on his or her path to whatever it is that he or she desires. Nagel would consider both of these people outliers and both of them foolish for they stray from the natural balance between desires and morals.

Nagel also says that politics is inextricably tied to ethics. He says that “there can be no ethics without politics”. Nagel says that these two things are tied because they both have to do with human interaction. The institutions that people live in determine the morals that they live by. And therefore, politics determines ethics. This would suggest that under varying political systems the people may have different ethical philosophies. This would also suggest that there is no universal, natural morals which determine the way people act. Nagel suggests that it would be a folly to try and invent a universal human nature to try and define our political theory. However, he does believe that there could be a partial solution; however he never postulates what it could be. I think that I agree with Nagel’s contention that there is no such thing as universal morals. I believe that a persons’ moral code is determined by the environment that they live in and the experiences that they have and not a natural law. In turn, I also believe that there is no such thing as a perfect government which coincides with a universal human nature.

Deontology: Totally Impractical

In the text entitled Contemporary Deontology by Ann Davis, the author goes through the basic tenements of deontology by describing its characteristics and constraints. In essence, Davis defines deontology as the sincere and rational avoidance of wrongdoing that ultimately results in less wrongdoing (Davis, 216). An example would be not murdering someone based on the rational argument that murdering is wrong. No matter what the consequences, murdering is always wrong. Within this, there are constraints that guide the deontologist in judgment that are negatively formatted, narrowly framed and narrowly directed (Davis, 208). Meaning, a guideline for the deontologists would be "don't steal" or "don't kill".

Of course, this way of thinking and tight constraints implies a high moral character. That is to say, it would be considered good for a person never to lie for any circumstance, or commit murder. Yet, this application in life shows that this way of thinking can also be considered morally questionable. For example, people who harbored Jews in Nazi occupied Europe. Surely they would have to lie in order to keep other human beings alive in their homes, yet according to the deontologist they are doing wrong? It seems absurd. Davis writes "(Deontologists) are not as responsible for the foreseen consequences of (their) actions" (Davis, 209). Meaning, the deontologist would say that the person who tells the Nazis that they are harboring Jews is better than the liar who says he is not due to the fact that he’s telling the truth. They would say that the result has nothing to do with the consequences of his actions, which is completely ridiculous in application.

On the other hand, however, it brings up the interesting question of weighing the life of another human against another. That is to say, if one is to reject the deontological position, it assumes that in the case of murder, there are certain circumstances where it is permissible. Davis discusses this problem by stating that even if the person may be deserving of death, the deontologist still does not have the right to do him harm (Davis, 207). In essence, unless the deontological rational is accepted, it is impossible to say that murder is wrong absolutely. According to this logic, it would seem that a non-deontological stance would be susceptible to a slippery slope in which almost any murder can be excused. For example, if we could choose to kill a dictator that plans on committing genocide on his people, surely a rational person would sacrifice an evil man to save innocent lives. But consider another example; a robber kills a police officer in a heist because the police officer was shooting at him. Unless the robber is a deontologist, he could say that his murder was permissible because it was self defense, even though we as observers would see it as murder.

Even though Deontology aims at the termination of wrongdoing, the only way it “works” is if the entire world were a strict deontologist, which is completely inconceivable.

Parameters for Determining Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative Values

In Christine M. Korsgaard’s Creating the Kingdom of Ends, the idea of togetherness and having a shared experience are the most critical pieces of information. Before analyzing Korsgaard’s beliefs and ideas, there are some terms that need to be explained. These terms are “agent-relative”, “agent-neutral”, “subjective” and “objective”. Agent-relative and subjective are the two terms which relate to each other while objective and agent-neutral relate to each other. I will explain this providing the meanings of these four terms. We’ll start with agent- relative. When something is agent-relative, then that thing is related to an individual and nobody else. In other words, anything agent-relative deals only with a particular agent and no other agent. This is connected to subjective matters as these matters are considered by Korsgaard as “personal property” (“Ends” 267). Agent-neutral values and objective matters are similar by the same way. Agent-neutral values are values pertaining to all agents and objective values are “common property” shared by all agents. Korsgaard responds to many of Nagel’s beliefs on values and agents. Nagel claims that whenever something subjective exists, it must’ve come from something objective. Right away, Korsgaard says that she cannot accept this argument. But I think that the argument may be justifiable. Take for example, an individual who is considering donating money, food and clothing to third world countries. This decision is subjective and agent-relative because the individual feels that it is good for him to help others in dire need. But behind this decision is the individual’s understanding that the preservation of life is critical not only to someone who can buy their own food and pay their own bills but also to the people who can’t. In the end, the decision is about the individual feeling good, but in actuality, the decision was based on a universal concept of life preservation.

Korsgaard continues to look into agent-neutral values and determines that there are 2 interpretations of these agent-neutral values. Her two interpretations are called “objective realism” and “intersubjectivism”. Objective realism revolves around the idea that something exists for its own reason and not for any other agent or matter. The example used by Korsgaard is the sun. It shines not because it’s vital for life to exist, but just because it’s just what it does. This led to Korsgaard looking into another one of Nagel’s claims on agent-relative values which I found interesting. Nagel explains why “reasons for autonomy”, “deontological reasons and “reasons of obligation” will always be agent-relative. Beginning with reasons for autonomy, if one desires to achieve something “idiosyncratic”, it is impossible for this decision to be agent-neutral because the individual desiring to achieve this will know that it is good for himself and not necessarily good for everybody else. He also knows that he would not get any assistance with his task or “project”. Next would be deontological reasons. These values can never be seen as agent-neutral because an individual acting against moral restrictions is acting against what is good for him or herself for what he or she considers a good end result. Finally, reasons for obligation must also never be looked at as agent- neutral because a relationship such as mother and son will cause all actions made by either the mother or son to be for the reason that they are family and not

Classical and Modern Moral Philosophy

In this article, Rawls starts out by stating the differences between classical philosophy and modern moral philosophy. He explains that by classical philosophy he means that of ancient Greece and by modern moral philosophy he means in the period of time from 1600 to 1800 (1). Rawls then goes to summarize both the classic and modern philosophies. He concludes that the Greeks “focused on the idea of the highest good as an attractive ideal, as the reasonable pursuit of our true happiness”(4). The main difference in the two philosophies came from three major developments in the time period. These developments were the Reformation, the development of the modern state, and the development of modern science (5). With the aspect of religion, there were five very important differences. In modern moral philosophy, Christianity was an authoritative religion, it was a religion of salvation, it was doctrinal, it was a religion of priests, and it was an expansionist religion (6). These five factors, along with the constant branching and wars during the Reformation, changed the question that was raised by the Greeks which was simply how to live, to the question of how to live with people from a different religion (8).

Later in the article, Rawls outlines Kant’s thoughts on science and religion. Kant is not troubled by, “The diversity and conflicts between our moral judgments”(15). Kant believes in what he calls “common human reason”(15) in which everyone judges in roughly the same way. He goes as far as to say that even the philosopher cannot have moral principles different than those of ordinary human reason. For Kant, science and morals are on equal grounds with one another. Both science and morals are forms of reason, one is theoretical and the other is pure, practical reason (15). I would agree with Kant in the respect that both science and morals are both forms of reason. Science is the theoretical form and morals are the pure or practical form. Following Kant’s idea of “common human reason,” this makes sense. The sciences are areas where theories are formed and tested. Said theories are always challenged and tested and reaffirmed. This is all done within human reason. Morals can also be a form of reason, though not so far as in all the speculating done within the theoretical reason. With morals, a person acts practically. These actions are pure forms or reason expressing themselves without needing to be put in theory and tested out beforehand.

Duty-free?

Kant expresses his beliefs regarding ethical duties to others in 448-461 of Metaphysics of Morals. Kant outlines his theories about what duties individuals have to others. Kant begins by stating that duties are divided into two categories, “duties to others in which one’s performance at the same time obligates them, and duties whose observance does not entail that obligation of other people” (Metaphysics of Morals 448). Throughout the remainder of this section, he relates multiple duties to these two categories.
Kant states his definitions of love and respect to further establish the premise for his argument. He defines love as “the maxim of benevolence; and this maxim results in beneficence”, and he defines respect as, “the maxim that limits our self-esteem by the dignity of humanity” (449). He distinguishes that the duty of love is a mutual exchange because it requires the other person to help the initiator benefit as well. In contrast, the duty of respect is one-sided; an individual exercising the duty of respect obligates only their self (450). Kant proceeds to analyze the duties of love, which include the duties of: beneficence, gratitude, and sympathy.
In describing the duty of beneficence, Kant makes an assertion that I disagree with. He states, “For every man who finds himself in need wishes that he might be helped by other men” (453). Kant asserts that if an individual states that they are not willing to help others in need, individuals have a right to not help them when they are in need. I agree with Kant that it is the duty of all men to be beneficent. However, I do not believe that every person in need wants to be helped by other men. I believe that there are many people in need who do not want the help of others. For example, many drug addicts, alcoholics, and individuals with eating disorders try to avoid the help of others. In many cases, these individuals realize they have a problem, but do not want to confront it. When reading this section, I wondered what Kant would say about individuals who avoid the help of others. Would Kant say that these individuals are excused from their duty to help others, until they get there own problems sorted out? I think that Kant would say that under certain conditions, individuals may be excused from their obligation to others due to their inability to help others as a result of their own problems. I believe that Kant would say that individuals are still required to uphold their duty to help these impaired people overcome their problems.

The End

This idea of duty, according to Kant, is necessary to achieve purpose in ones life. He claims that duty is not to have any constraint, except that of self- constraint (380). By this it seems that Kant believes humans are natural beings easily led astray, not always following the correct path, the path to duty. The doctrine of duties, which Kant uses to explain the “capacity and resolved purpose to resist an unjust opponent” (380) is an all encompassing doctrine, in a sense it explains how we should lead a good life. Within this broader sense, there are lesser doctrines such as the doctrine of virtue, which brings about internal freedoms under the laws. However, with each duty, there is an end. This end is achieved through our own thought.

Kant describes the end as an object of choice, by which the choice determines the object or the final outcome (381). There are two ways one can achieve this end, either by starting from the end to find the beginning or by starting from the beginning to find the end. The first is known as the doctrine of right, in the sense that the end is attained through free choice, while the latter way is known as ethics, where the “concept of duty” leads a man to find the proper end (382). In either case man cannot be forced to do what he does not want to.

It would seem that the ethical way of achieving an end would be the easiest and the most “correct.” One would only need to have a starting point and follow the concept of duty (i.e. perfecting oneself and/or making oneself morally happy (386)) in order to accomplish an end. However, by beginning from the end one as a much clearer understanding of how to fulfill the ultimate goal. It becomes much easier to map out a plan. By doing this one ensures that they follow the concepts of duty, never being led astray by natural means (380). As Kant says, an end is determined by free choice. “The representation of the end determines choice to an action whereby the object is produced” (385). Free choice: that is the key to the concept of duty and ends. Humans are rational natural beings, which allows us to be led from the correct path. Yet, because we are rational we have the chance to lead a good life by following the ends that correspond to duties.

Autonomy and Heteronomy

For Kant, when rational beings pursue morality and the kingdom of ends, they elevate themselves above the demands of nature and of their material circumstances. Thus, they establish the independence, or "autonomy," of their will (Groundwork 440). By contrast, when a person’s goals are determined by something other than universal law, their will is "heteronomous" in that it depends on external factors in determining its goals. Kant titles autonomy of the will as "the supreme principle of morality" and he describes heteronomy of the will as "the source of all spurious (fake) principles of morality" (440-441).

There have been philosophical systems that have made the mistake of advancing bases for morality that would in fact render the will heteronomous. Empirical principles (principles good with qualification) cannot be the basis of morality, because they are always heteronomous. Even when the goal is personal happiness, concerns about particular outcomes or courses of events can never have the status of universal laws of nature. Rational principles like the will of the divine are likewise heteronomous because they do not come from pure concepts of reason in that we have no notion of divine perfection other than that which we derive from our own moral concepts (443). Anytime someone does something in order to attain something else--whether that something else is happiness or perfection or the satisfaction of some physical need or desire--the person's will is determined by that something else; the will is heteronomous and the corresponding maxim of the action makes sense only in the particular and not as a universal law of nature. The basic idea that moral actions are undertaken for the sake of duty alone seems to be based on a notion of the autonomy of the will.

I have a problem with Kant’s position though because it seems too theoretical. Kant seems to think that reason is something that people can use to develop universal laws and moral principles. I feel that there are different ideas that make sense to people of different cultures. I'm thinking universal means universal to Kant and this is hard for me to grasp. Kant's notion of "autonomy" is either unclear or unlikely. Kant event admits that his notions of "autonomy" and of a "kingdom of ends" are concepts that we cannot be proven in real life but with pure practical reason. It makes sense to "Always choose in such a way that in the same volition the maxims of the choice are at the same time present as universal law" (440). However, I find this difficult to accomplish.

Preservation of Our Animal Nature

Kant discusses the duty of a man to himself as the “preservation of himself in his animal nature” (Groundwork 421). In this section, Kant proposes many ways of destructing one’s animal nature; suicide, self-mutilation, using one’s body in a sexual way not intended for reproduction, drunkenness, gluttony and “stupefying agents” such as opium and other products of the plant kingdom (427). Kant makes the case that suicide is a crime --it is not only a violation of one’s duty to other men (or other duties such as that of a spouse, a father, or a citizen) but most importantly it is a violation of the duty to oneself (422). Kant claims that “a man is still obligated to preserve his life simply because he is a person and must therefore recognize a duty to himself” (422).

While the righteousness or lack thereof of suicide is a common theme in literature, plays, religion and other influential aspects of society, Kant identifies another form of destruction of one’s animal nature, and that is the act of self-mutilation. Kant believes that when one “deprives himself of certain integral parts by dismembering or mutilating himself” he is guilty of partial destruction of one’s animal nature (421). Kant goes on to offer examples of “partial self-murder” such as giving away or selling a tooth so it can be planted in the jawbone of another person, or submitting oneself to castration in order to gain an easier livelihood as a singer (423). To me, this would imply that Kant regards all cosmetic surgery as self-mutilation, and therefore partial murder of oneself. Cosmetic surgery is widespread throughout today’s media, and very prevalent among celebrities. Kant takes an interesting stance on this issue; in one regard I don’t believe cosmetic surgery is such a huge deprivation of one’s nature, but in the way that it suggests one is not comfortable in one’s body, it does seem like an abandonment of the duty to preserve oneself.

Kant says that “this is not the case with the amputation of a dead organ” (423). This leads me to question how Kant would feel about live organ donation for a noble cause. For example,someone donating a kidney to a family member in order to save his or her life.In that case, is that still destruction of our animal nature and partial self-murder, even if it is completely selfless and has a noble cause? I believe that Kant would say no, because he says, “Where there is courage, there is always respect for the humanity in one’s own person.” If one is respecting the humanity in one’s own person, how can they be participating in partial self-murder at the same time? To say Kant would support this somewhat contradicts his previously stated position on replanting a tooth in another person’s jawbone but, because donating a live organ is not lack of respect for one’s body or one’s nature (instead, it is a courageous act to aid another) I believe that Kant would recognize the courage and respect for humanity in a live organ transport done for the sake of a noble cause. This would differ from surgery for the purposes of changing oneself for the sake of being accepted in society, or trying to improve one’s appearance or abilities. I think it’s safe to assume that Kant would not be a Michael Jackson fan,because he would regard his cosmetic alterations as partial destruction of self and “degrading the humanity in his person” (423).

Debbie Downer

In Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Immanuel Kant seeks to establish and define the supreme principle of morality. But his account of this moral principle in Section 2 leaves one feeling disheartened rather than feeling closer to being able to employ and achieve morality.

The moral law is one that can be applied universally, and therefore does not take into account experience, or circumstance--it is not situational. An act is to be judged moral through its intentions and not any of its consequences. In order for an action to be truly moral, its maxim must be solely based on the command of duty. He places morality on such a high pedestal admitting that “most of our actions are in conformity with duty” but when we examine their intentions we find that duty is not the only source driving the action, and therefore cannot be defined as moral (4:407-408).

He urges us not to rely on examples to understand morality because you cannot find “a single case in which the maxim of an action otherwise in conformity with duty rested simply on moral grounds and on the representation of one’s duty,” meaning that there is not one case where there is not some sort of egotistic driving force behind an action (Kant 4:407). Not only is this a negative view of human nature, but also who is he to judge every persons intentions? If a person finds a cell phone and returns it to the owner, refusing any compensation, does he have any selfish intentions or aspirations? And even if this person did accept compensation, who is to say that it was a driving force behind his decision to return the phone? Kant says that “imitation has no place at all in matters of morality,” but doesn’t this imitation of good and moral actions help enforce this tendency towards a moral principle (4:409)?

Kant creates this notion of morality that makes it near impossible for us to behave morally, or even recognize moral actions are being preformed. By having morality rest solely on reason and not experience, he might explain the principle of morality but at no point explains how we can come closer to reaching it. What good is understanding morality if we do not have the capacity of achieving it?

Kant Find One

In this section of Groundwork, Kant continues his search for a law that can determine the will without reference to any expected effect—so the will can be called absolutely good without qualification. To find this law, Kant has stripped the will of any urge or compulsion that would come to light via the adherence of any particular law. Therefore, there are no developed/underlying principles, but the universal conformity of actions to serve as a societal standard. Kant believes that your actions should have the ability to be seen as a universal law, and conformity to the universal “serves the will as principle and must so serve it if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a chimerical concept.” (Groundwork, 14) By practicing conformity, man solidifies various principles/maxims that are perceived as good duties/laws. Kant emphasizes that humankind has always lived by this theory of ordinary reason and to prove it he poses this question. “When I am in distress may make a promise with the intention of not keeping it?” (Groundwork, 14) In other words would it be acceptable to make a lying promise in times of difficulty. Kant continues by discussing the two implications of this question that are: if making a false promise corresponds with prudence or duty. Prudence is the act of showing care and thought for the future and it plays a role in telling a false lie. Yet telling a false lie due to prudence is not clever because we will never know the full consequences of the lie. Kant states “even with all my supposed cunning; loss in confidence in me might prove to be far more disadvantageous than the misfortune which I now try to avoid.” (Groundwork, 14) The most sensible way to act would be through a universal maxim and not promise anything without intending to keep it. Kant then points out that there is a schism between truthfulness from duty and truthfulness from fear of disadvantageous consequences. Basically, truthfulness from duty is that the action contains a law for us, while in the latter one must weigh the ramifications that are connected with the action. Another keynote difference between them is that one can abandon the maxim of prudence.

Kant also believes that this question could be answered if the lying promise could hold as a universal not just for one person, but for others as well. Henceforth, can everyone make a promise they cannot keep? However a lying promise could not work for all because no one would be believed, and if someone did believe you they would pay you back in “like coin.” Kant stresses that one’s maxim should have the ability become a universal law, and if not it should be rejected—due to the fact that it would not hold as a possible legislation for universal law. By conforming to this universal, acting respectfully toward the practical law, and expunge our desires we define our duties. And we all know that duty is worth more than all-else. Kant then explores the difference between practical judgment and theoretical judgment and comes to the conclusion—wherein he opines that practical judgment is more favorable. Because, practical judgment is more certain than the thoughts of any philosopher.

In summation, Kant believes that ordinary human reason should leave its sphere and seek philosophy. He also stresses that peace is only attainable via thorough critical examination of our reason.

It is your duty! (to read this blog post)

In Groundwork, Kant delves into the concept of duty when he presents four cases and their relation to duty. First, Kant omits all actions that are contrary to duty, and while he never explicitly mentions examples, actions such as lying, cheating, or stealing certainly fall under this category. These actions not only conflict with the concept of duty, but contradict it as well. The second case involves actions that may align themselves in accordance with duty, yet one has no immediate inclination towards the action, and rather performs them for selfish motivations; motivations that, as Kant says, are easily recognizable. Kant sets aside these first two cases, because their actions are not done from duty or immediate inclination, and in the second case, is done for selfish reasons. The third case consists of actions that accord with duty, and where a person has an immediate inclination to such an action. An example of this would be someone who does not commit adultery because they love their spouse and sees them as the most desirable. The fourth case is when one’s actions accord with duty but are contrary to their immediate inclinations. An example of this would be someone who does not commit adultery even though they don’t desire their spouse, even when they turn out to be a horrible person. Ultimately, it is within cases three and four that Kant discusses different types of duties.

The first duty discussed is the duty to preserve one’s life. Kant states that this is a duty that everyone has an immediate inclination to and while one acts from this inclination it is often because of fear and therefore acts with no moral content (an example of case three). While in accordance with duty, they do not act from duty. If one wished for death, yet preserved life while not loving it, they would then be acting purely from duty and in this case would be acting with moral content (an example of case four). The second duty Kant addresses is the duty to be beneficent where one can. He states that one may find pleasure in acting beneficent towards another and truly find satisfaction from such an act. This act is then good and should be praised, but still has no moral worth. This is an example of case three, because while these actions are good and praise worthy, from them arises such things as the inclination of honor. While the inclination of honor, when done for what is beneficial to another, is within agreeance to one’s duty it still lacks moral content. Only if one had no inclination to be beneficent yet does so out of duty can have moral worth in their actions, which is an example of case four. The last duty discussed is one’s duty to secure one’s own happiness. In regards to this Kant says, “men already have, irrespective of duty, the strongest and deepest inclination toward happiness, because just in this idea are all inclinations combined in a sum total.” (Groundwork, 399) In this we see that of all inclinations happiness is the most innate inclination that we have, for which all others strive for. Kant also addresses that it is difficult for man to formulate one specific idea of what happiness is, so often times they are compelled toward one single inclination to produce satisfaction and happiness rather than achieving the universal happiness. If one were to choose to enjoy what makes them happy, and accept what suffering he may encounter as a result his actions he then is acting contrary to the universal inclinations to happiness. Therefore, in some regard, he is acting out of duty and is denying his inclinations and as a result contains moral worth in his action, which is in accordance with case four.

Ultimately it is seen that only actions done from duty, and not in accordance with duty has worth, in other words case four. Acting in accordance implies an action that is aimed at an end, and actions with such motives will never have moral worth. Kant writes, “From what has gone before it is clear that the purposes which we may have in our actions, as well as their effects regarded as ends and incentives of the will, cannot give to actions any unconditioned moral worth.” (Groundwork 400) Furthermore duty is performed out of respect for the law. Only the law can be a thing of respect and therefore can be an authority. It is with this in mind that Kant states that the only thing that can determine the will and that even if all of ones inclinations suggest otherwise one must accord with the law.

Kant and the Idea of Good Will

In the first section of Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant begins his argument by indicating that there is absolutely nothing that “can be regarded as good without qualification, except a good will” (Kant 7). Unlike Aristotle (and the Ancient Greeks in general), Kant doesn’t think that any virtues (he calls them temperaments or character qualities) are good alone. Wealth, power, influence, or good fortune are also not good alone. All of these things require good will behind them as a qualification for judging them good. It is how such things are used that makes them good; and “unless there is a good will to correct their influence on the mind” and to keep these things in check with their proper and good purpose, then they cannot be good. Therefore, good will is an essential qualification for such things to be good, and good will is the only thing that can be considered good without any other qualifications. As Kant says, these things have “no intrinsic unconditional worth, but… always presuppose… a good will” (7).

However, Kant goes one step further and says that because a good will is the only thing that is good in itself, it is therefore also good because it is simply good in and of itself and not because it necessary affects anything else or accomplishes anything beyond being good in and of itself. He says, “… it is good only through its willing, i.e., it is good in itself” (7). This being established leads us to a tricky point. If just possessing a good will is good, and the good will is good itself without ever needing to consider its effects or accomplishments, then the person with a good will may never use his good will to accomplish anything and still be considered good. Kant says, “… if with the greatest effort, it should yet achieve nothing, and only the good will should remain,… yet would it, like a jewel, still shine by its own light as something which has its full value in itself” (8). This seems logical. It is certainly a logical conclusion. However, let’s think of it a bit differently. Say you were given the chance to own the Hope Diamond. With a few provisos. Under no conditions were you permitted to sell it, set it for wearing, or donate it to a museum. You were allowed to enjoy its beauty privately, but you would never be allowed to show it to anyone else. Would you want it? Wouldn’t we say that the beauty of the diamond is in the eye of the beholder? What if there weren’t any beholders? No one would see it and no one would ever know you had it.

We Don't Need Another Hero...

The development of heroes is somewhat natural, but we don't need any more. A hero is a person who is excellent in the eyes of the general population. But this doesn't necessarily make the hero virtuous. A hero could easily have faults that the general population doesn't know about. Also, although it is questionable whether a hero has actually achieved happiness (whether in current terms or Aristotle's terms), the first heroes had no model hero that they emulated. They earned virtue of their own means.... no need for a hero.

If the people follow a hero who appears to have almost "superhuman" capabilities, they may never find the drive to reach their own fullest potential. If they believe they will never reach the level of virtue of their hero, the people may just give up on achieving virtue altogether. If a person believes a hero will always be there to save him, he may never worry about his own personal and moral responsibility.

Why We Need More Heroes

It seems like we already have a lot of heroes in our society so why would our society need another?
-Due to the diversity of our society we need a diverse group of heroes
-We always have someone to look up to, we always have hope.

Telos and Eudaimonia

According to Aristotle's theory of virtue, every human being has certain goals to achieve during their lifetime. This is called telos. More specifically, telos is the purpose or the end that humans are placed on earth to acheive. Yet, as Macintyre writes "Every activity, every enquiry, every practice aims at some good" ("Aristotle's Account of the Virtues" 148). This good is defined as something human beings aim for ("Aristotle's Account of the Virtues" 148). Aristotle gives the good the name eudaimonia. Aristotle defines eudaimonia as the state of being well and doing well ("Aristotle's Account of the Virtues" 148). Therefore, Macintyre points out the tension between Aristotle's telos and the good (eudaimonia) as whether they are the same or different.

Virtues, as explained by Macintyre, are neccessary to acheive eudaimonia and affect reaching telos. Virtues are qualities that are used to achieve the highest human happiness. And so, the highest good for humans is happiness. Therfore, as humans aim for some end or purpose, achieving eudaimonia is equivalent to reaching telos.

In the modern world today, the idea of eudaimonia being equivalent to telos is achieving a career goal such as becoming a doctor. If one person sets his/her goal in life to becoming a doctor, then when the goal is reached that person achieves both telos and eudaimonia. Since the person sets becoming a doctor as a goal in life, it is the same as telos. At the same time, the person reaches eudaimonia. Being a doctor can mean financially doing well and morally doing well. Since doctors tend to have high salaries, they are financially doing well. Also, they help cure people's illnesses so they are morally well. So finally, they have reached eudaimonia both financially and morally. As Macintyre would say "what constitutes the good for man is a complete human life lived at its best" ("Aristotle's Account of the Virtues" 149).

Macintyre's argument about the telos and eudaimonia is sound. Aristotle does not explain whether a telos and eudaimonia can be equivalent. Although some of his arguments do support this theory, Aristotle separately defines both telos and eudaimonia. Can this have for people to decide? Or is it a different reason?

"The price for Justice is always paid by someone else"

Alasdair Macintyre hits at one of the most fundamental structural issues of Aristotle’s moral theory in his chapter on “Justice as Virtue: Changing Conceptions”, in his book After Virtue. He begins by discussing the way in which one attains virtue, “… a disposition or sentiment which will produce in us an obedience to certain rules” (Justice 244), by following a predetermined set of rules. However, “an agreement on what the relevant rules are to be is always a prerequisite for agreement upon the nature and content of a particular virtue” (244). As Macintyre demonstrates in his early example of citizens A and B, both may have the same concept of the virtue of Justice, however their application of the rules of attaining such virtue are much different. One can infer the overall basic thesis of this chapter is that one’s idea of a virtue, in this chapter, Justice, is comprised of their supposed rules in attaining said virtue. As Macintyre goes on to discuss, this leads to many different viewpoints of Justice.

Macintyre goes on to give the example of citizen A and Citizen B in a society. Each has a view of what the virtue justice means to them. To put it in lay man’s terms, (the non-philosophic like me), these ideas have been formed as a result of their everyday experiences and what they have come to know to be true. In the case of Citizen A, he has worked hard to earn his living, and needs the monetary rewards of his hard work to help put his child through college or whatever the case may be. He see’s Uncle Sam’s high taxation to give to those who, in his mind, do not work as hard, as an injustice. Citizen B on the flipside see’s the injustices of society on those of the impoverished and sees the governments aid of those people as true justice. In each example, the virtue of Justice is different, based off of what each person’s experiences have been for them.

As these examples put forth by Macintyre are excellent examples of the differences in the “Rules” as he says in attaining a virtue, justice, I believe this is not the heart of his argument. “Moral Philosophy reflects the debates and disagreements of the cultures so faithfully, that it’s controversies turn out to be unsettled in just the way that the political and moral debates themselves are” (Justice 252). The overall premise of this chapter, “Justice as Virtue: Changing Conceptions”, is that our society cannon hope to achieve “moral consensus” (252). “Too many disparate and moral concepts… No way of settling the issues between them rationally” (252).

He even invokes the beliefs of two previous philosophers, Rawls and Nozick. He goes on to discuss how each of there respective viewpoints and how Rawls deals with the ‘veil of ignorance’ and Nozick deals with the ‘Principle of distributive justice of entitlement’. However one common snag continues to hang in the way, the ‘incommensurable weighing of claims’. In both examples of the aforementioned philosophers, both place the individual first, and society secondary, as Macintyre puts it, “Shipwrecked on an Island”.

What he comes to conclude is that there can be no moral consensus. Governments in societies are simply just a “reflection of the extent to which our conflicts need to be suppressed” (254), and the government does not represent or express the Morals of the community of citizens.

Justice vs. Injustice

Aristotle claims that there are various attributes of justice and injustice. He states that justice is defined by being both lawful and just, and that injustice is quite the opposite. However, it seems strange that many of the definitions he gives of both justice and injustice overlap. For example, Aristotle says that “an act of injustice and a just act are defined by the voluntary and the involuntary” (Nicomachean Ethics 79). He further confuses me by saying that “actions are involuntary, then, if they are done in ignorance; or they are not done in ignorance, but they are not up to the agent; or they are done by force” (79). These two statements baffle me. Firstly, Aristotle is stating that an act of injustice and an act of justice are both defined by the same factors. How, then, are we supposed to differentiate one from the other? And, if Aristotle’s second statement bears truth, then how are we supposed to distinguish between the meanings of voluntary and involuntary acts? Aristotle does explain that individuals act on both involuntary and voluntary actions, however his characterization of what defines voluntary acts seems unclear. Aristotle states that “in some of our voluntary actions we act on a previous decision, and in some we act without previous decision. We act on a previous decision when we act of previous deliberation, and we act without previous decision when we act without previous deliberation” (79). If we can act voluntarily with both previous deliberation or absolutely no previous thought at all, how can we characterize both as being voluntary?

Aristotle addresses the question, “is it sometimes voluntary and sometimes involuntary” that we suffer injustice? Aristotle explains that there is a difference between suffering injustice and doing injustice. He explains that no one can truly suffer an injustice willingly. Aristotle also states, that “the same question arises about receiving justice. Since doing justice is always voluntary (as doing injustice is), is it reasonable for the same opposition to apply in both cases, so that both receiving justice and suffering injustice will be either alike voluntary or alike involuntary” (81). In my point of view, it seems that receiving justice or suffering injustice will be unknown, for it does not seem that in lifelike circumstances, we receive justice or suffer injustice knowingly, but rather accordingly. As Aristotle claims, “part of the politically just is natural, and the other part legal” (78). As Aristotle states, there are three kinds of injustices made: mistakes, misadventures and injuries. Injustice done out of ignorance is an inaccuracy, injustice done because something went wrong is an accident, and injustice done without previous deliberation is hurt.

What I found to be prominent in this segment was that Aristotle explains that justice is not only defined by being loyal to the law. Laws are part of defining what is and is not just, but there is a natural component that is far more complex. Exhibiting true will lead to true justice. Individuals who lack this virtue are blinded from seeing what is truly just. It is a natural characteristic that some inhibit.

With a Little Help From My Friends

In Book 8, chapters 2 through 11, Aristotle delves into the third essential when it comes to happiness; friendship. More specifically, Aristotle points out, there are different kinds of friendships as we may be well aware. On the one hand, there are friendships that are founded out of need or utility—that is—one person benefiting from someone else as they provide “goods or pleasures”, with this type of friendship considered to be incomplete (Friendship, 121). On the other hand, there are friendships based out of “goodwill” and in this friendship “each of them loves what is good for himself and repays in equal measure the wish and the pleasantness of his friend; for friendship is said to be equality. And this is true above all in the friendship of good people” (125). This is because there is no superiority-inferiority relationship in this friendship. According to Aristotle, the goodwill and sharing friendship is the one that best exemplifies virtue because it is complete—both parties involved are sending and receiving goods, there is no imbalance. In this complete friendship, there is no slander because there is the element of trust in this “true” friendship (124).

What would you think if I sang out of tune—would you stand up and walk out on me? According to Aristotle, you would because this type of friendship is “easily dissolved…for if someone is no longer pleasant or useful, the other stops loving him” (121). If you were friends with this person “coincidentally”, let’s say you found them pleasant because of their singing voice. Because the voice of the person is “no longer pleasant” (121), this friendship based out of coincidence would most certainly dissolve, for the “beloved (in this case the singer) is loved not insofar as he is who he is, but insofar as he provides some good or pleasure” (121). This is the reason why Aristotle insists that “base people will be friends for pleasure or utility” (124) because this is an incomplete friendship, and thus could not possibly contribute to happiness because happiness is about living a complete life; something that is incomplete could not lead to complete happiness. Could an incomplete jigsaw piece, one that is torn and broken or fake complete a jigsaw puzzle? Absolutely not, because the picture would be incomplete. So in a way, friendship and virtue are connected because it takes two people of virtuous character to form a friendship which in of itself is virtuous, which in turn leads to completeness which then leads to happiness.

My question to Aristotle is this; if friendship and virtue are in fact similar in a way, then can there be an excess and deficiency in friendship? I believe Aristotle would agree that there can be a deficiency in friendship, insofar as having no friends would in fact be a deficiency. As far as excess, he believes “complete friendship like erotic passion is like an excess” but its “naturally directed” at someone else (125) so thus because its natural, it is like a bodily need, therefore there cannot be a negative excess such as rashness with respect to bravery, or gluttony with respect to temperance.

Incontinence Made Me Do It

Book seven (chapters 1-10) of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics discusses the characteristics of Incontinence. He first begins by determining whether an incontinent person has knowledge. Aristotle mentions that Socrates believed that an incontinent person could not have knowledge, but is driven by ignorance. However, an incontinent person pursues an action even when he knows it is wrong to pursue it. For example, an incontinent person would know that it is wrong to steal, but does so anyway in the moment that he does the deed. Aristotle asserts that the knowledge that an incontinent person has is comparable to the knowledge that a drunk or a person who is affected by strong feelings would have because they “have knowledge in a way and do not have it.”(Nicomachean Ethics 103)

Next Aristotle differentiates between two different kinds of incontinence, one is of the appetite and the other is of the spirit. Incontinence of the spirit means that a person is overcome by reason whereas a person who is incontinent about appetite is not overcome by reason but by gratification. A person who is incontinent about the spirit would be a person who pursues an action through faulty reasoning, such as a person who is overeager to help a friend, but because of his over, eagerness does not fully hear or understand the instructions given and thus becomes more a hindrance than a help.

Incontinence is therefore caused by an inability to “abide” by some force that would make a person give in to an action that is known to be wrong. A continent person is one who withstands the base desire and does not go against a belief or knowledge of what is known to be wrong. Aristotle’s main argument is to connect incontinence with intemperance, which was why it is important to first clarify that an incontinent person has knowledge. Both intemperance and incontinence, along with temperance and continence, deal with pleasure and pain. However, the incontinent person and the intemperate person will pursue a pleasure when it is wrong for different reasons. An incontinent person purses a pleasure when it is wrong, even when he is aware that the action is wrong, whereas an intemperate person does not view the action as wrong. Therefore, Aristotle views the intemperate person as worse than the incontinent person because the intemperate person has no reason to pursue the pleasure. They pursue pleasure simply for the gratification of the result. An incontinent person will have a reason caused by a base desire that they are unable to withstand. To clarify the example given earlier of stealing, an incontinent person would steal, let us say a new PS3, the person knows that stealing is wrong, but steals the item because the desire of the PS3 is greater than that of the knowledge that stealing is wrong. I believe Aristotle would say that the intemperate person would be the kleptomaniac that steals the PS3, not because of any great desire for it, but simply because the action of stealing itself is the pleasure.

The converse of this is not the same, since the temperate person is better than the continent person is because the temperate person has no base desires to overcome and sees no pleasure in the excess of things.

Virtue and Judgment: How is There Justice?

A basic understanding of Virtue as defined in Nicomachean Ethics shows that virtue is enacted through actions. The question of concern in book III is whether that action is voluntary or involuntary and what this means in the judgment of virtue. Involuntary actions are those that are forced, and therefore since the agent of action really contributed nothing to the actions being done we have a hard time assigning virtue. Deciding whether an action is voluntary or involuntary becomes a little more convoluted when someone has a choice, but because of external conditions one is practically left without a choice. For example telling a lie to save your mother, you have a choice to tell the truth but in reality you are forced to tell the lie because of the external condition of saving your mom.

So how does one choose what good justifies what evil? On one end of the spectrum it seems that everything can be qualified as forced, for example one can say in defense of stealing, that he did it to feed his family, he was forced to engage in the evil in order to provide for his family, is it justified? This is the stream of logic that Aristotle poses. The question that I pose however, is where do you draw the line, in a separate but similar example one could say that he was forced by the promise of pleasure to steal the stereo. How can any action be qualified as virtuous since almost everything that one does has an ulterior motive which can justify to a certain extent any action. This is why I believe that justice could not be based off of this ethics system, all that one would have to prove is that they had sufficient reason to do what they did and then they would walk, how do you judge what is sufficient reason.

This predicament is furthered when Aristotle brings ignorance to the picture, our justice system states that ignorance does not free someone from judgment, I think that this is necessary for establishing a justice system because how would you assign justice when anyone could simply claim ignorance in their defense. However I see the reasoning as to why the consideration of ignorance in assigning judgment, might be necessary. What if someone truly was ignorant of the fact that what they are doing is wrong and not virtuous, what if everyday John Doe goes outside and sprinkles rice around his yard for the birds to eat, he thinks that he is doing something virtuous but in reality the birds eat the rice and die when it expands in their stomach. Is he guilty? I don’t know.

He says that actions in response to appetite or spirit or spur of the moment actions are voluntary and should be included when judging virtue, but they are not a decision. Decision as Aristotle defines it is what I believe to be the most solid evidence of judging virtue, the decisions that one makes especially those that are heavily deliberated over are the most solid pieces of evidence to ones character. I believe this to be true because in my opinion to make a decision after deliberating over it, one has taken into account all of the possibilities that the outcome could be, this forces one to dig deep into his beliefs and decided whether or not he is going to follow these beliefs and since this decision is not rushed he has had time to research what he is going to decide so as not to be ignorant.