Virtue and Judgment: How is There Justice?

A basic understanding of Virtue as defined in Nicomachean Ethics shows that virtue is enacted through actions. The question of concern in book III is whether that action is voluntary or involuntary and what this means in the judgment of virtue. Involuntary actions are those that are forced, and therefore since the agent of action really contributed nothing to the actions being done we have a hard time assigning virtue. Deciding whether an action is voluntary or involuntary becomes a little more convoluted when someone has a choice, but because of external conditions one is practically left without a choice. For example telling a lie to save your mother, you have a choice to tell the truth but in reality you are forced to tell the lie because of the external condition of saving your mom.

So how does one choose what good justifies what evil? On one end of the spectrum it seems that everything can be qualified as forced, for example one can say in defense of stealing, that he did it to feed his family, he was forced to engage in the evil in order to provide for his family, is it justified? This is the stream of logic that Aristotle poses. The question that I pose however, is where do you draw the line, in a separate but similar example one could say that he was forced by the promise of pleasure to steal the stereo. How can any action be qualified as virtuous since almost everything that one does has an ulterior motive which can justify to a certain extent any action. This is why I believe that justice could not be based off of this ethics system, all that one would have to prove is that they had sufficient reason to do what they did and then they would walk, how do you judge what is sufficient reason.

This predicament is furthered when Aristotle brings ignorance to the picture, our justice system states that ignorance does not free someone from judgment, I think that this is necessary for establishing a justice system because how would you assign justice when anyone could simply claim ignorance in their defense. However I see the reasoning as to why the consideration of ignorance in assigning judgment, might be necessary. What if someone truly was ignorant of the fact that what they are doing is wrong and not virtuous, what if everyday John Doe goes outside and sprinkles rice around his yard for the birds to eat, he thinks that he is doing something virtuous but in reality the birds eat the rice and die when it expands in their stomach. Is he guilty? I don’t know.

He says that actions in response to appetite or spirit or spur of the moment actions are voluntary and should be included when judging virtue, but they are not a decision. Decision as Aristotle defines it is what I believe to be the most solid evidence of judging virtue, the decisions that one makes especially those that are heavily deliberated over are the most solid pieces of evidence to ones character. I believe this to be true because in my opinion to make a decision after deliberating over it, one has taken into account all of the possibilities that the outcome could be, this forces one to dig deep into his beliefs and decided whether or not he is going to follow these beliefs and since this decision is not rushed he has had time to research what he is going to decide so as not to be ignorant.

Maybe pleasure isn't so bad afterall...

Book seven (chapters 11-14) of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics addresses the controversial topic of pleasure. Aristotle quickly points out that there are multiple views and opinions regarding pleasure as either good or bad. All three of the views provided by Aristotle hold the belief that pleasure cannot be wholly good or good at all. Aristotle states the reason for these beliefs as “Every pleasure is a perceived becoming toward [the fulfillment of something’s] nature, but no becoming is of the same kind as its end.” (Nicomachean 114) As shown by the passage, Aristotle critiques other philosophers for seeing pleasure as a process as opposed to an activity. For example, watching movies can bring us pleasure, but seeing a movie does not ultimately bring us to some final state.

Chapter twelve continues by discussing pleasure’s ultimate relation to good or bad. Aristotle believes things can be good or bad either without qualification or specifically to the person or thing. This statement points out that there are different kinds of pleasures we pursue depending on our current state and Aristotle points out we seek different pleasure depending on whether our nature is being refilled or is has already been fully restored. Aristotle finally states “…pleasures are not becomings, nor do they all even involve a becoming. They are activities, and an end [in themselves] and arise when we exercise [a capacity], not when we are coming to be [in some state].” (Nicomachean Ethics 115) While some pleasures can be perceived as “bad” (ie: those that are pleasant without qualification), pleasure comes naturally as we fulfill the desires of our nature in an unimpeded manner. Pleasure does not bring us to a final end, but pleasure is an end in itself by satisfying our natural appetites.

So where does pleasure fit in the ultimate goal of happiness? To examine this we must first believe that pleasure can be the best good. Aristotle points out everyone can agree pain is an evil and should be avoided. If something is not bad and should not be avoided then it must be good just as pleasure must be a good (in the circumstances we are seeking a good pleasure). Does this mean that the best good might be some kind of pleasure? Aristotle gives the example that if each state has an unimpeded activity which is happiness then this activity surely would be the best choice. By exercising this choice (unimpeded) we are pursuing an activity which we defined earlier as pleasure. By pursuing this “good” pleasure (an unimpeded activity) we ultimately arrive at happiness. All animals and beings pursue pleasure to a certain extent which only shows it must be the best good, but we must keep in mind we all have different natures and states which account for differences in what we consider pleasurable.

Aristotle’s final point concerns bodily pleasures and how people often associate such pleasure with intemperate people. Bodily pleasures are good up to a point, but the danger comes from the notion that we can have an excess of bodily pleasures. We can enjoy bodily pleasures such as sex in a temperate manner, but some people enjoy sex in excess and such behavior projects intemperance. So why do we pursue these pleasures to excess? According to Aristotle, bodily pleasures mask pain and the excess of bodily pleasure serves as a cure or remedy to those things that bring us pain. Other people lack pleasure in other area of their lives and compensate by seeking bodily pleasures because their natural condition simply is painful to them. Abusers of pleasure aside, pleasure with no pain has no excess such as the pleasure from learning. To sum up, some pleasures are good or bad depending on why they are pleasurable to us. To say the pursuit of pleasure is bad contradicts the pursuit of happiness because to complete the ultimate end of happiness we much satisfy the desires of our natural state in an unimpeded manner a.k.a the pursuit of pleasure. We all have different natures so naturally we all have different pleasures. Some pleasures can be taken to excess such as bodily pleasures, but this does not mean bodily pleasures are bad.

Individual Virtues of Character: Bravery

In Book III of his renowned philosophical work Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes several distinctions regarding the individual character virtue of bravery. Primarily, he attempts to differentiate between the genuine virtue of bravery and conditions and circumstances in which only the appearance of bravery exists.

First, Aristotle, who considers bravery as the mean between feelings of fear and confidence (Nicomachean 40), acknowledges that even a brave person must feel fear simply because he or she is human. One who does not fear such things as a bad reputation or poverty and sickness, for example, clearly cannot be considered brave, rather they are disgraceful. A truly brave person, however, is one who is able to stand firm against his or her fears, or any frightening conditions, with rationality and confidence “for the right end, in the right way, at the right time” (Nicomachean 41). Consequently, the main focus of the brave person, according to Aristotle, is to aim for the “fine,” or what is itself beautiful (kalos) and deserving of admiration (Nicomachean 328), because “to the brave person bravery is fine; hence the end it aims is also fine” (Nicomachean 41). This is always true of a genuinely virtuous action.

This characteristic is what distinctly separates bravery from the extreme conditions of rashness and cowardice. A rash, excessively fearless person is someone who merely puts on the facade of a brave person, but in actuality could never confront the frightening conditions that a brave person could. In other words, they are all talk and no action. On the other hand, a coward, someone who is excessively afraid, lacks the proper confidence to ever achieve bravery. Even though bravery, rashness, and cowardice all revolve around the same issue, Aristotle believes they have “different states” (Nicomachean 42). Only bravery has the right state needed to perform a brave action.

Aristotle also presents many circumstances that appear similar to bravery, but in fact are not examples of genuine bravery. For instance, he describes how the bravery of citizens seeks to avoid reproach and desire honor, which is something fine, but it is still does not involve doing something for its own sake (Nicomachean 43), therefore, it is not genuine. In addition, he mentions how a professional soldier’s experience and familiarity in wartime can be confused with bravery, however, “they turn out to be cowards whenever the danger overstrains them” (Nicomachean 43). He goes on to explain how hopefulness, spirit, and ignorance can be confused with bravery as well. None of these conditions, however, exemplify genuine bravery because they do not possess the correct intentions or end. Genuine bravery must aim solely at the fine and cannot be achieved through any other motivation or condition.

If I could propose a question to Aristotle I would want to know if he believes that a brave person could help another person to become brave. Aristotle would probably respond by saying that since bravery is a virtue of character, we can only acquire it by ourselves through habituation. People cannot simply learn how to perform brave actions from someone else because it requires our own internal self, not anyone else.

Virtue: A Thing of Habit

The idea of being a virtuous person involves being just, righteous, brave, etc. The list could go on and on, but one thing remains constant: these characteristics were not obtained through birth. Instead virtue is learned through teaching, and from this teaching we are able to decide whether to be virtuous or not. According to Aristotle a person must be in the habit of doing virtuous acts at a mean in order to acquire the title of being a “good” virtuous person (“Nicomachean Ethics” 18).

With virtue there is a good or bad approach. We are not born with either good or bad outlooks on virtue, but are rather taught, and through habit with either acquire a just or unjust outlook on life (“Nicomachean” 19). When it comes to obtaining a virtuous status, a person has to obtain an early habit of virtue. Someone who knows virtue and practices it at a young age is more likely to be virtuous later on in life. However, it is important that when a person learns of virtue he/she learns of its opposite. By learning of virtues opposite it allows us to find a middle ground so that we are not over-virtuous.

I know it is hard to imagine being “over-virtuous,” but it is possible. It is important to not be excessive or have a deficiency of virtue. A middle-ground is necessary to preserve healthy and balanced virtue. Only out of habit is this middle-ground of virtue obtainable. There are ways of experiencing virtue in a way that we do not become overly virtuous, but rather are strong and capable of being virtuous (“Nicomachean” 20). As Aristotle puts it, “It is similar with bravery; habituation in disdain for frightening situations and in standing firm against them makes us become brave, and once we have become brave we shall be most capable of standing firm (Nicomachean 20).

It is true that in order to reach the status of “good” in terms of virtue, one must find the mean or middle-ground of a virtue. Aristotle goes on to say, “This is enough, then, to make it clear that in every case the intermediate state is praised, but we must sometimes incline toward the excess, sometimes toward the deficiency; for that is the easiest way to hit the intermediate and good condition” (“Nicomachean” 30). There is a balance that we all must find in order to be labeled as “good” with virtue. My question for Aristotle now is: do people lacking knowledge of the opposite of virtue always tend to be overly virtuous?

Aristotle would answer that question with a resounding “no”. My thinking behind that would be because there is no knowledge of virtues opposite an individual has any option other than that of being overly virtuous. A balance could not exist if there is nothing there other then being completely virtuous. The only habit that person would pick up would be that of being overly virtuous.