Monday, February 1, 2010

Individual Virtues of Character: Bravery

In Book III of his renowned philosophical work Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes several distinctions regarding the individual character virtue of bravery. Primarily, he attempts to differentiate between the genuine virtue of bravery and conditions and circumstances in which only the appearance of bravery exists.

First, Aristotle, who considers bravery as the mean between feelings of fear and confidence (Nicomachean 40), acknowledges that even a brave person must feel fear simply because he or she is human. One who does not fear such things as a bad reputation or poverty and sickness, for example, clearly cannot be considered brave, rather they are disgraceful. A truly brave person, however, is one who is able to stand firm against his or her fears, or any frightening conditions, with rationality and confidence “for the right end, in the right way, at the right time” (Nicomachean 41). Consequently, the main focus of the brave person, according to Aristotle, is to aim for the “fine,” or what is itself beautiful (kalos) and deserving of admiration (Nicomachean 328), because “to the brave person bravery is fine; hence the end it aims is also fine” (Nicomachean 41). This is always true of a genuinely virtuous action.

This characteristic is what distinctly separates bravery from the extreme conditions of rashness and cowardice. A rash, excessively fearless person is someone who merely puts on the facade of a brave person, but in actuality could never confront the frightening conditions that a brave person could. In other words, they are all talk and no action. On the other hand, a coward, someone who is excessively afraid, lacks the proper confidence to ever achieve bravery. Even though bravery, rashness, and cowardice all revolve around the same issue, Aristotle believes they have “different states” (Nicomachean 42). Only bravery has the right state needed to perform a brave action.

Aristotle also presents many circumstances that appear similar to bravery, but in fact are not examples of genuine bravery. For instance, he describes how the bravery of citizens seeks to avoid reproach and desire honor, which is something fine, but it is still does not involve doing something for its own sake (Nicomachean 43), therefore, it is not genuine. In addition, he mentions how a professional soldier’s experience and familiarity in wartime can be confused with bravery, however, “they turn out to be cowards whenever the danger overstrains them” (Nicomachean 43). He goes on to explain how hopefulness, spirit, and ignorance can be confused with bravery as well. None of these conditions, however, exemplify genuine bravery because they do not possess the correct intentions or end. Genuine bravery must aim solely at the fine and cannot be achieved through any other motivation or condition.

If I could propose a question to Aristotle I would want to know if he believes that a brave person could help another person to become brave. Aristotle would probably respond by saying that since bravery is a virtue of character, we can only acquire it by ourselves through habituation. People cannot simply learn how to perform brave actions from someone else because it requires our own internal self, not anyone else.

2 comments:

Wajamo said...

After reading this segment and having the benefit of discussing the topic in class, there are a few things that I would like to say in regards to your post. You mentioned that in order to be brave, you must fear a bad reputation, and poverty and sickness. I believe that Aristotle would disagree, he mentions that bravery has different objects that it can be shown through. Some are legitimate such as death and war, and others are illegitimate. The parameters for these objects centers around whether they are within control. Aristotle specifically points out that bad reputation, poverty and sickness are all outside of self control and therefore are illegitimate objects. In other words, in the face of such objects, one cannot show bravery.

In addition, I understood Aristotle's definition of rashness differently as well. Rashness to Aristotle may look like bravery, but it is not simply a facade. One who is rash does not have fear for things which should be frightening. For Aristotle, one must have fear in order to overcome it to become brave.

Overall, my understanding of Aristotle's take on bravery is as follows. Barring some exceptions, whether or not someone is brave is based objectively on the reason someone does something through a legitimate object/ situation and the favorable historical and social outcome of the situation.

Sal Cusumano said...

Thanks for responding to my post. First off, I completely agree with your assertion that bravery has different objects, some of which are legitimate (i.e. death, war, failure, pain) and others which are not. In my post, I was simply reiterating Aristotle’s argument that someone who does not fear certain conditions, such as a bad reputation, or poverty and sickness, should not be labeled as brave, as he or she often is, “since the brave person is also a type of fearless person” (Nicomachean Ethics 40). This does not mean that someone who does fear these conditions is considered to be a brave person, or that in order to be brave you must fear these things. A person who is “decent and properly prone to shame” (Nicomachean Ethics 40), however, should fear something like a bad reputation, but they are not, in fact, “brave.” Perhaps I was not clear enough in making this distinction.

To your other point, I also agree that rashness is not having the façade of bravery alone. The rash person also lacks the fear a brave person has for the proper things which should be feared, as you stated, and that is why they act excessively and are not brave. As Aristotle states, the brave person must “stand [firm] against the right things and [fear] the right things, for the right things, for the right end, in the right way, at the right time” (Nicomachean Ethics 41). I probably should have included this other understanding of rashness in my post as well. Overall, I find your assessment of Aristotle’s conception of bravery to be fairly accurate. I hope this clarifies everything.