Wednesday, February 17, 2010

Justice vs. Injustice

Aristotle claims that there are various attributes of justice and injustice. He states that justice is defined by being both lawful and just, and that injustice is quite the opposite. However, it seems strange that many of the definitions he gives of both justice and injustice overlap. For example, Aristotle says that “an act of injustice and a just act are defined by the voluntary and the involuntary” (Nicomachean Ethics 79). He further confuses me by saying that “actions are involuntary, then, if they are done in ignorance; or they are not done in ignorance, but they are not up to the agent; or they are done by force” (79). These two statements baffle me. Firstly, Aristotle is stating that an act of injustice and an act of justice are both defined by the same factors. How, then, are we supposed to differentiate one from the other? And, if Aristotle’s second statement bears truth, then how are we supposed to distinguish between the meanings of voluntary and involuntary acts? Aristotle does explain that individuals act on both involuntary and voluntary actions, however his characterization of what defines voluntary acts seems unclear. Aristotle states that “in some of our voluntary actions we act on a previous decision, and in some we act without previous decision. We act on a previous decision when we act of previous deliberation, and we act without previous decision when we act without previous deliberation” (79). If we can act voluntarily with both previous deliberation or absolutely no previous thought at all, how can we characterize both as being voluntary?

Aristotle addresses the question, “is it sometimes voluntary and sometimes involuntary” that we suffer injustice? Aristotle explains that there is a difference between suffering injustice and doing injustice. He explains that no one can truly suffer an injustice willingly. Aristotle also states, that “the same question arises about receiving justice. Since doing justice is always voluntary (as doing injustice is), is it reasonable for the same opposition to apply in both cases, so that both receiving justice and suffering injustice will be either alike voluntary or alike involuntary” (81). In my point of view, it seems that receiving justice or suffering injustice will be unknown, for it does not seem that in lifelike circumstances, we receive justice or suffer injustice knowingly, but rather accordingly. As Aristotle claims, “part of the politically just is natural, and the other part legal” (78). As Aristotle states, there are three kinds of injustices made: mistakes, misadventures and injuries. Injustice done out of ignorance is an inaccuracy, injustice done because something went wrong is an accident, and injustice done without previous deliberation is hurt.

What I found to be prominent in this segment was that Aristotle explains that justice is not only defined by being loyal to the law. Laws are part of defining what is and is not just, but there is a natural component that is far more complex. Exhibiting true will lead to true justice. Individuals who lack this virtue are blinded from seeing what is truly just. It is a natural characteristic that some inhibit.

8 comments:

Dan Azzari said...

I think that you are confusing yourself by misinterpreting Aristotle's use of the word "defined." You say that you're confused because Aristotle's "definitions" of justice and injustice overlap. I don't think this is the case. In the section that you are referencing on page 79, Aristotle isn't "defining" justice or injustice. Instead, he is specifying when an action is just or not, and says that whether an action is voluntary or not is the deciding factor.

One can only do an action that is just or do injustice when it is done willingly. This is similar to bravery; one can only be brave--or a coward--when it is a voluntary decision. Accidentally stepping on a spider is not bravery, and accidentally being unfair is not injustice.

Its important to see that justice and injustice are not defined by a voluntary action. Even though Aristotle says "An act of injustice and a just act are defined by the voluntary,"(79) his usage of "defined" is misleading. From my understanding, I think he is saying an act is "determined" to be an act of justice or injustice based on whether or not it is voluntary. Aristotle continues, "for when an action is voluntary, the agent is blamed," and the same holds for injustice. One is held accountable for one's actions. In that respect, justice and injustice overlap, but not in definition.

Natalie Amato said...

I think that Aristotle uses voluntary and involuntary actions to instruct us on how we should treat injustice and injustful people. He says that "some involuntary actions are to be pardoned,and some are not" (80) Before this statement, he explains that the involuntary actions that we do in "ignorance" or by force are not considered acts of injustice. I think that Aristotle is trying to clarify that if you know you are doing an unjust act, you are unust. He says that if a person "does it in knowledge, without previous deliberation, it is an act of injustice" (80). If it is vice that causes a person to act unjustfuly, only then can that person be "unjust and vicious" (80). Those types of people, then, should not be pardoned. However, someone who acts justly from knowledge of what is good(either voluntarily or involuntarily) without focusing on what he or she will get out of it, is someone who has knowledge of what is good, or just.

Later, Aristotle uses incontinence to further prove his point that knowledge is the deciding factor of whether an act is considered just or unjust. Like the incontinent person, the injustful person possesses knowledge. However, they choose to do bad actions. When knowledge is present, and a decision is made towards the wrong choice, Aristotle finds that this pushes us farther away from virtue.

Sal Cusumano said...

In your blog post you mention that laws not only define what is just, but also what is not just. I don’t think this is technically in accord with Aristotle’s understanding of the law. According to Aristotle, the law is what “instructs us to do the actions of a brave person…a temperate person…a mild person” (Nicomachean Ethics) 68). Essentially, the law serves as a model of virtuous activity, or what we should do. The law should not be viewed as something negative which tells us what we can’t do. As we discussed in class, the law actually lays out all the different types of virtues and is therefore considered to be complete virtue. Also, Aristotle believes the law is conventional because it differs from community to community. So, what is just for one group of people might not be considered just for another.

In addition, you mention in your post how Aristotle argues that no one can truly suffer injustice willingly. I would like to expand further on this topic, more specifically concerning Aristotle’s discussion of whether or not a person can willingly do injustice to him/herself. Aristotle gives the obvious example of a person who commits suicide. This person, as Aristotle states, obviously “does this willingly, in violation of correct reason, when the law forbids it; hence he does injustice” (Nicomachean Ethics 84). This would seem to indicate that, in fact, a person can willingly do injustice to him/herself because he or she carries out the action with full knowledge of “the person, instrument, and goal” (Nicomachean Ethics 79), and does not do it coincidentally or by force. Aristotle, however, argues that this person actually does a great injustice to the community and not to him/herself. In response to this injustice, the community “penalizes him and inflicts further dishonor on him for destroying himself” (Nicomachean Ethics 84). I find this very interesting because it exemplifies how much emphasis in Ancient Greek society is placed on how one is viewed by other people.

Chris Reich said...

Sal- I was reading the last part of your comment and found it very interesting. First, it seems there is a contradiction with your statement that a person who commits suicide does greater damage to the community and the community "penalizes him and inflicts further dishonor on him for destroying himself" (Nicomachean Ethics, 84). I find it contradictory because while you mention how the community suffers a greater injustice, it would seem to me that the victim endures more injustice as they are dishonored.

In order to better understand the term justice, one needs to remember there are two types of of justice, legal and absolute. Legal justice is that which is despensed by the human law, the code of conduct humans have created in order to live better lives. On the other hand, absolute justice, which seems to come from a truely virtous person. Legal justice may not always be correct, therefore equity is used to close this imbalance. However, absolute justice is above equity, the highest of all justices and always correct.

I am still confused about voluntary and involuntary justice. In class on Friday we discussed how murder was involuntary but what if the murder is premeditated, wouldnt it become voluntary?

Sal Cusumano said...

Thanks for responding to my post Chris. This is a very complex issue, but this is my understanding of Aristotle's argument. Aristotle believes that it is impossible for a person to willingly suffer injustice; therefore, when a person commits suicide, it is the city or community in which he or she lives that suffers the injustice. The individual person only suffers disgrace and dishonor because of his or her actions. A distinction must be made between suffering dishonor and suffering injustice. It is possible for one to dishonor oneself by doing dishonorable actions, but injustice is different. Justice and injustice deal with a certain reciprocity between people. As Aristotle states, “what is just or unjust must always involve more than one person” (Nicomachean Ethics 85). Consequently, it is only possible for someone to cause injustice to his or her community and not his or herself.

Now, concerning your question about voluntary and involuntary justice, I believe you have an incorrect understanding of these two concepts. Remember, justice and injustice deal with a certain reciprocity, or cooperation between people. As we discussed in class, justice of rectification resolves an exchange in which inequality has taken place. This exchange can be voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary exchanges include transactions between people such as buying and selling, lending, renting, marriage, etc. (Nicomachean Ethics 71). These are exchanges in which both sides voluntarily agree to a set of terms. Involuntary exchanges, on the other hand, do not include willing exchanges between two parties. Aristotle gives examples of involuntary exchanges such as theft, poisoning, imprisonment, and murder (Nicomachean Ethics 71). Aristotle’s argument is that these actions are involuntary because no person would willingly agree to be robbed, poisoned, held captive, or killed by another person. This is why murder, whether premeditated or not, is considered to be an involuntary exchange.

Timothy Patel said...

Sal, you seem to have a pretty good comprehension of what Aristotle is talking about when it comes to justice vs. injustice and voluntary and involuntary. I think I understand these points. However, I was wondering if you think that Aristotle’s system of equity is really applicable even in those days? Because Aristotle’s particular justice involves the relatively equal exchange of goods in these cases, he associates particular injustice with greed or the desire to have more than one’s due. I don’t think it is ever going to be clear that one person’s gain is always equal to another person’s loss. If I steal an item of some great, intrinsic, and priceless item of yours, your loss exceeds my gain. I understand that this is an involuntary exchange, but still will you ever get justice as rectification especially if the item is damaged. Furthermore, does Aristotle assume that if one person is treated unjustly, then another person must have acted unjustly toward that person? He believes that injustice is a result of wanting more than one’s fair share and has stated explicitly that behavior motivated by lust or anger is not unjust but rather from being not human or natural like being lustful for its own sake. Can’t a person can suffer a loss, and hence suffer an injustice, as a result of someone else’s lust, anger, or cowardice. I don’t think any one would ever get rectification they deserve. Aristotle says, “If, then, first of all, proportionate equality is found, and, next reciprocity is also achieved, the proportionate return will be reached” (75). Currency may do this, but that concern is only physical. I guess I feel that reciprocity will never be achieved and according to Aristotle that is not a real community?

Hollister Baffert said...

Addressing the question that Aristotle asks, “is it possible to do injustice to oneself or not?” (84). As Sal mentions in his post, “no one can truly suffer an injustice willingly,” but my question is… is it possible to do justice to oneself or not? Aristotle says, “what is just or unjust must always involve more than one person,” and he continues going more in-depth into how doing injustice is worse than suffering injustice (85). Aristotle does not necessarily give evidence to how it would not be possible to do justice to oneself. I wonder since Aristotle believes that justice and injustice are basically the same concepts, but opposite of one another, if the evidence he presents for not being able to do injustice to yourself applies to justice in the same way. This brings me to another question, Aristotle says, “doing injustice is worse… suffering injustice is less bad” (85). This brings up the question on which is better, doing justice or receiving justice? I believe Aristotle would say that doing justice is better, just as “doing injustice is worse” (85). This is because the acts are voluntary whereas receiving justice or injustice is involuntary.

Sal Cusumano said...

Timothy, I think you make a very good point in your post concerning justice and injustice. I agree with your assertion that the rectification of inequality between people will not always be equal and fair emotionally, even if it is technically monetarily just. As you stated in your example, if you damaged or lost some possession of mine which I had a great emotional attachment to, one that exceeded any monetary value, no amount of money could actually restore what I had lost. Even if a judge ordered you to pay me an amount of money exactly proportional to the amount of damage done, it could never make up for the sentimental value of the item to me. For Aristotle, however, money is the only thing which can make things proportionately equal to one another because, as he says, “everything…must be measured by some one measure” (75) and “everything is measured by currency” (76). Technically Aristotle is right, you really can put a price on just about anything and achieve economic justice every time, but I don’t believe Aristotle really considers or cares about the emotional value of items.