Showing posts with label pleasure. Show all posts
Showing posts with label pleasure. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 13, 2010

Virtue can be pleasurable....

In chapter four of Utilitarianism by John Stuart Mill, the philosopher explores the contention between desiring pleasure and desiring virtue. In order to do this he further defines the notion of happiness as “the only thing desirable as an end; all other things being desirable as a means to that end” (35). Does this mean morality is subsidiary to happiness? Mill answers this question by explaining that the relationship between virtue and vice correlate to the one between pleasure and pain. Virtue and pleasure are the equivalent because both are means for happiness, in the same manner that the absence of vice and pain lead to happiness. What’s even more controversial than this the idea that virtue and pleasure can be one in the same, is that in a person can desire virtue for itself (36). For example, I can desire virtuousness by becoming a nun for the sake of the virtues that type of life entails. Becoming a nun was the means to attaining virtue and therefore achieving happiness. According to Mill, anything that is desired for its own sake is craved for as a part of happiness (38). Desiring virtue is initially a means to happiness but can become a part of happiness as shown in the example above.


The contention between pleasures and virtue encompasses one of the susceptibilities for the proof of utility. Mill believes that it is a “physical and metaphysical impossibility” to desire things other than in proportion the pleasure it offers (39). This means that the only reason a person would desire virtue is because it offers some degree of pleasure. Even if leading a life of virtue means leading a life with less personal happiness. As the philosopher explains in previous chapters of this essay, the noble person is the best means to happiness because they sacrifice their own desires for the sake of a greater food. The notion of virtue is something that is different for every person. Does the doctrine of utility account for these different and sometimes even conflicting notions of virtuousness? For example, a pro-life activist believes virtue means preserving life at all cost. When a baby is conceived, abortion is an act of murder in this notion of virtue. However, a pro-choice activist believes virtue means sparing life for a greater good. When a sick a person is suffering, helping them pass on is the virtuous thing to under a pro-choice ideal. What is the greater good in this case? With which notion of virtue would the doctrine of utility agree with?

Thursday, February 4, 2010

Maybe pleasure isn't so bad afterall...

Book seven (chapters 11-14) of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics addresses the controversial topic of pleasure. Aristotle quickly points out that there are multiple views and opinions regarding pleasure as either good or bad. All three of the views provided by Aristotle hold the belief that pleasure cannot be wholly good or good at all. Aristotle states the reason for these beliefs as “Every pleasure is a perceived becoming toward [the fulfillment of something’s] nature, but no becoming is of the same kind as its end.” (Nicomachean 114) As shown by the passage, Aristotle critiques other philosophers for seeing pleasure as a process as opposed to an activity. For example, watching movies can bring us pleasure, but seeing a movie does not ultimately bring us to some final state.

Chapter twelve continues by discussing pleasure’s ultimate relation to good or bad. Aristotle believes things can be good or bad either without qualification or specifically to the person or thing. This statement points out that there are different kinds of pleasures we pursue depending on our current state and Aristotle points out we seek different pleasure depending on whether our nature is being refilled or is has already been fully restored. Aristotle finally states “…pleasures are not becomings, nor do they all even involve a becoming. They are activities, and an end [in themselves] and arise when we exercise [a capacity], not when we are coming to be [in some state].” (Nicomachean Ethics 115) While some pleasures can be perceived as “bad” (ie: those that are pleasant without qualification), pleasure comes naturally as we fulfill the desires of our nature in an unimpeded manner. Pleasure does not bring us to a final end, but pleasure is an end in itself by satisfying our natural appetites.

So where does pleasure fit in the ultimate goal of happiness? To examine this we must first believe that pleasure can be the best good. Aristotle points out everyone can agree pain is an evil and should be avoided. If something is not bad and should not be avoided then it must be good just as pleasure must be a good (in the circumstances we are seeking a good pleasure). Does this mean that the best good might be some kind of pleasure? Aristotle gives the example that if each state has an unimpeded activity which is happiness then this activity surely would be the best choice. By exercising this choice (unimpeded) we are pursuing an activity which we defined earlier as pleasure. By pursuing this “good” pleasure (an unimpeded activity) we ultimately arrive at happiness. All animals and beings pursue pleasure to a certain extent which only shows it must be the best good, but we must keep in mind we all have different natures and states which account for differences in what we consider pleasurable.

Aristotle’s final point concerns bodily pleasures and how people often associate such pleasure with intemperate people. Bodily pleasures are good up to a point, but the danger comes from the notion that we can have an excess of bodily pleasures. We can enjoy bodily pleasures such as sex in a temperate manner, but some people enjoy sex in excess and such behavior projects intemperance. So why do we pursue these pleasures to excess? According to Aristotle, bodily pleasures mask pain and the excess of bodily pleasure serves as a cure or remedy to those things that bring us pain. Other people lack pleasure in other area of their lives and compensate by seeking bodily pleasures because their natural condition simply is painful to them. Abusers of pleasure aside, pleasure with no pain has no excess such as the pleasure from learning. To sum up, some pleasures are good or bad depending on why they are pleasurable to us. To say the pursuit of pleasure is bad contradicts the pursuit of happiness because to complete the ultimate end of happiness we much satisfy the desires of our natural state in an unimpeded manner a.k.a the pursuit of pleasure. We all have different natures so naturally we all have different pleasures. Some pleasures can be taken to excess such as bodily pleasures, but this does not mean bodily pleasures are bad.