Virtue can be pleasurable....

In chapter four of Utilitarianism by John Stuart Mill, the philosopher explores the contention between desiring pleasure and desiring virtue. In order to do this he further defines the notion of happiness as “the only thing desirable as an end; all other things being desirable as a means to that end” (35). Does this mean morality is subsidiary to happiness? Mill answers this question by explaining that the relationship between virtue and vice correlate to the one between pleasure and pain. Virtue and pleasure are the equivalent because both are means for happiness, in the same manner that the absence of vice and pain lead to happiness. What’s even more controversial than this the idea that virtue and pleasure can be one in the same, is that in a person can desire virtue for itself (36). For example, I can desire virtuousness by becoming a nun for the sake of the virtues that type of life entails. Becoming a nun was the means to attaining virtue and therefore achieving happiness. According to Mill, anything that is desired for its own sake is craved for as a part of happiness (38). Desiring virtue is initially a means to happiness but can become a part of happiness as shown in the example above.

The contention between pleasures and virtue encompasses one of the susceptibilities for the proof of utility. Mill believes that it is a “physical and metaphysical impossibility” to desire things other than in proportion the pleasure it offers (39). This means that the only reason a person would desire virtue is because it offers some degree of pleasure. Even if leading a life of virtue means leading a life with less personal happiness. As the philosopher explains in previous chapters of this essay, the noble person is the best means to happiness because they sacrifice their own desires for the sake of a greater food. The notion of virtue is something that is different for every person. Does the doctrine of utility account for these different and sometimes even conflicting notions of virtuousness? For example, a pro-life activist believes virtue means preserving life at all cost. When a baby is conceived, abortion is an act of murder in this notion of virtue. However, a pro-choice activist believes virtue means sparing life for a greater good. When a sick a person is suffering, helping them pass on is the virtuous thing to under a pro-choice ideal. What is the greater good in this case? With which notion of virtue would the doctrine of utility agree with?

Virtue and Judgment: How is There Justice?

A basic understanding of Virtue as defined in Nicomachean Ethics shows that virtue is enacted through actions. The question of concern in book III is whether that action is voluntary or involuntary and what this means in the judgment of virtue. Involuntary actions are those that are forced, and therefore since the agent of action really contributed nothing to the actions being done we have a hard time assigning virtue. Deciding whether an action is voluntary or involuntary becomes a little more convoluted when someone has a choice, but because of external conditions one is practically left without a choice. For example telling a lie to save your mother, you have a choice to tell the truth but in reality you are forced to tell the lie because of the external condition of saving your mom.

So how does one choose what good justifies what evil? On one end of the spectrum it seems that everything can be qualified as forced, for example one can say in defense of stealing, that he did it to feed his family, he was forced to engage in the evil in order to provide for his family, is it justified? This is the stream of logic that Aristotle poses. The question that I pose however, is where do you draw the line, in a separate but similar example one could say that he was forced by the promise of pleasure to steal the stereo. How can any action be qualified as virtuous since almost everything that one does has an ulterior motive which can justify to a certain extent any action. This is why I believe that justice could not be based off of this ethics system, all that one would have to prove is that they had sufficient reason to do what they did and then they would walk, how do you judge what is sufficient reason.

This predicament is furthered when Aristotle brings ignorance to the picture, our justice system states that ignorance does not free someone from judgment, I think that this is necessary for establishing a justice system because how would you assign justice when anyone could simply claim ignorance in their defense. However I see the reasoning as to why the consideration of ignorance in assigning judgment, might be necessary. What if someone truly was ignorant of the fact that what they are doing is wrong and not virtuous, what if everyday John Doe goes outside and sprinkles rice around his yard for the birds to eat, he thinks that he is doing something virtuous but in reality the birds eat the rice and die when it expands in their stomach. Is he guilty? I don’t know.

He says that actions in response to appetite or spirit or spur of the moment actions are voluntary and should be included when judging virtue, but they are not a decision. Decision as Aristotle defines it is what I believe to be the most solid evidence of judging virtue, the decisions that one makes especially those that are heavily deliberated over are the most solid pieces of evidence to ones character. I believe this to be true because in my opinion to make a decision after deliberating over it, one has taken into account all of the possibilities that the outcome could be, this forces one to dig deep into his beliefs and decided whether or not he is going to follow these beliefs and since this decision is not rushed he has had time to research what he is going to decide so as not to be ignorant.

Virtue: A Thing of Habit

The idea of being a virtuous person involves being just, righteous, brave, etc. The list could go on and on, but one thing remains constant: these characteristics were not obtained through birth. Instead virtue is learned through teaching, and from this teaching we are able to decide whether to be virtuous or not. According to Aristotle a person must be in the habit of doing virtuous acts at a mean in order to acquire the title of being a “good” virtuous person (“Nicomachean Ethics” 18).

With virtue there is a good or bad approach. We are not born with either good or bad outlooks on virtue, but are rather taught, and through habit with either acquire a just or unjust outlook on life (“Nicomachean” 19). When it comes to obtaining a virtuous status, a person has to obtain an early habit of virtue. Someone who knows virtue and practices it at a young age is more likely to be virtuous later on in life. However, it is important that when a person learns of virtue he/she learns of its opposite. By learning of virtues opposite it allows us to find a middle ground so that we are not over-virtuous.

I know it is hard to imagine being “over-virtuous,” but it is possible. It is important to not be excessive or have a deficiency of virtue. A middle-ground is necessary to preserve healthy and balanced virtue. Only out of habit is this middle-ground of virtue obtainable. There are ways of experiencing virtue in a way that we do not become overly virtuous, but rather are strong and capable of being virtuous (“Nicomachean” 20). As Aristotle puts it, “It is similar with bravery; habituation in disdain for frightening situations and in standing firm against them makes us become brave, and once we have become brave we shall be most capable of standing firm (Nicomachean 20).

It is true that in order to reach the status of “good” in terms of virtue, one must find the mean or middle-ground of a virtue. Aristotle goes on to say, “This is enough, then, to make it clear that in every case the intermediate state is praised, but we must sometimes incline toward the excess, sometimes toward the deficiency; for that is the easiest way to hit the intermediate and good condition” (“Nicomachean” 30). There is a balance that we all must find in order to be labeled as “good” with virtue. My question for Aristotle now is: do people lacking knowledge of the opposite of virtue always tend to be overly virtuous?

Aristotle would answer that question with a resounding “no”. My thinking behind that would be because there is no knowledge of virtues opposite an individual has any option other than that of being overly virtuous. A balance could not exist if there is nothing there other then being completely virtuous. The only habit that person would pick up would be that of being overly virtuous.