Monday, April 26, 2010

The Rights and Wrongs of Warfare

In Thomas Nagel's War and Massacre Nagel discusses two different types of reasoning which are the Utilitarian and the Absolutist reasoning. Utilitarian reasoning deals with the ends of an action while Absolutist reasoning assesses the action itself. At the very beginning, it seems that the two are substitutes of each other where only either one is used in certain situations. But later on, we discover that Absolutist reasoning is actually a limitation of Utilitarian reasoning. The existence of these two is also the reason why we have dilemmas that we have to decide on. As Nagel says, there is nobody who completely neglects either reasoning when making a decision. This forces one to have to choose between the end and the action itself. For example, when one decides to rob a bank, he or she needs to decide between being able to feed his family or not stealing because it is not acceptable. Up until now, Utilitarianism aims to maximize good and minimize evil but it doesn't really discuss the means by which you maximize the good and minimize evil. This is where Absolutist reasoning comes in and tries to account for the lack of limitations in Utilitarianism by making the thinker consider the acceptability of his or her action while trying to maximize good and minimize evil.


Moving onto the absolutist restrictions in warfare, Nagel says that there are two types. One type is the restrictions on the manner of the attack. The second is the restrictions on the class of people at whom the aggression or violence may be directed. (Massacre 62) Before we make any acts of aggression or hostility, we need to first determine the true object that deserves this type of treatment. A scenario that can be used to explain these two restrictions would be a situation where someone is throwing grenades at someone else. The person being thrown at should only retaliate to the grenadier and not to anything else that the grenadier may be vulnerable. To distinguish whether an individual is the true object that is rightfully subject to these hostile acts, one must decide whether that individual is the one posing the threat to him or her. The grenadier in this scenario is the true object but the person who is providing the grenades to him is not rightfully subject to hostile treatments because he is not directly causing the harm. As for the restrictions on the manner of attack, there are acts of hostility that Nagel says are never permissible. These acts are the types that aim to "attack the men, not the soldier." (Massacre 70) What I took from this is that the impermissible acts are the ones that cause so much damage to someone to a point where they don't feel like a normal person anymore. So as Nagel says, using a flamethrower against someone is an absolute atrocity because it does so much permanent damage to someone. While Nagel was able to analyze the acceptability of certain acts during warfare, there are still many things that simply cannot be explained by just Utilitarian and Absolutist reasoning.

Tuesday, April 20, 2010

The Lack of Universal Utilitarianism

The Utilitarianism that Sedgwick advocates, is a philosophy which seeks the greatest happiness for the greatest amount of people, operating off of a morality system which is based off of a universal understanding or common sense morality. However he realizes in this section that “Humanity is not something that exhibit’s the same properties always and everywhere,” meaning that it is “Absurd to lay down a set of utilitarian rules for mankind generally.” I feel that Sedgwick, although he clearly realizes that this is an issue, belittles it by believing that even though Utilitarianism is not able to transcend different cultures or belief systems it can still work within a certain culture. He believes that we have our own “Societies morality,” and that when looking at others “We can realize imperfections.”

This is a problem however because in the modern world not only is there no universal common sense or common morality that can transcend culture, today there is not one uniform culture even within a defined geographical location. So nowhere can a Utilitarian world exist. In his writing he proposes a rather absurd idea, that if everybody was to be “Converted at once to utilitarianism and if everybody left behind there own old moralities, then it would work.” I agree with him on this point in both that it would work if it could ever be possible, and that it is completely unrealistic. There will never be a universal morality it is impossible even if we were all born into a culture of the same set of beliefs people are always going to challenge moralities that they are given, I think that Sedgwick belittles the significance of an individuals life experiences and individual beliefs in determining morality. Since no two people have the same experiences in life there will never be a universal common sense or universal morality.

I really like Mr. Stephens scientific take on morality, that the ultimate end is not happiness but instead preservation of oneself and the community. I like this not necessarily because I agree with it, but merely because it is such a different take on morality which I have never seen or thought of. Even when he speaks of common sense it can barely hold because if different societies have different values then common sense is going to change as well. If in my society there is an extreme shortage of water and to bring the rains we must sacrifice a cow and in another society cows are seen as holy and if you kill the cow you will have bad fortunes in this life and the next, then common sense is no doubt going to be varied. Also again even within our own cultures these contradictions will exist.

We're Not All Perfect

Sidgwick understands the natural flaws that we all have as human beings. These flaws can possibly prevent us from reaching our happiness and attain our Common Sense. These imperfections come from our intelligence and our sympathy.

For intelligence, “We must also allow further for the limitation of intelligence: for in all ages ordinary men have had a very inadequate knowledge of natural sequences; so that such indirect consequences as have been felt have been frequently traced to wrong causes, and have been met by wrong moral remedies, owing to imperfect apprehension of the relation of means to ends. (459)” We as humans do not have the best education in life on life experiences. We learn as we go. Thus, we have to make our mistake with intelligence in order to learn. Sidgwick believes that this type of education needs to be limited so that it does not affect our ability for proper Common Sense.

But in the end he believes that these imperfections are not really affecting his proof unless they happen in extremes. (459) Utilitarianism ideals still stand.

I think that Sidgwick is making a good argument in understanding our flaws as humans, but not using it as an excuse. We need to realize that we have these possible flaws. But, we have to control them so that we can work towards happiness.

Thursday, April 15, 2010

So, Justice Can't be Universalized??

In John Stuart Mill’s digestion of the relationship between justice and utility, it is evident that the main point he is trying to make is that the notion of justice is not something that is not and never will be universalized. Mill states that the reason for this impossibility is that justice varies in different persons because we all have different notions of utility (Utilitarianism, 46). In other words, what we think is wrong or right, depends on what we each find to be pleasurable to us. Mill uses a very good example to illustrate this idea. His example of how the payment of taxes should be distributed amongst society members is actually an issue that is present even in today’s society. While some people think that it is unjust to tax the poor as much as the rich, others believe that it is only just to equally tax everybody. Which one, therefore, is really just? Mill purposely leaves this question unanswered because the answer purely depends on that person’s utility.

While Mill ultimately believes that social utility is the deciding factor of what is just, he highlights a few common grounds that must hold for everyone’s notion of justice at the beginning of the chapter. He names 5 “general rules” that universally hold when analyzing what is just/unjust: (1) “It is unjust to deprive anyone of his personal liberty, his property, or any other thing which belongs to him by law” (44), (2) Law is not the deciding factor for what justice is because there may exist “bad laws” (44), (3) “Each person should obtain that which he deserves” (45), (4) “It is unjust to break faith with anyone” (45), (5) “It is unjust to show favor or preference to one person over another in matters to which favor and preference do not properly apply” (45).

I found that the point Mill is trying to make is that we can determine if people are wrong or right depending on what we think they ought to be doing (49). However, it seems to me that Mill is contradicting himself when he says this because he previously outlines 5 universal guidelines that hold for justice. If we call people wrong based on what we think they ought to be doing, there is a possibility that others will not think the same way. It seems as though Mill transitions from talking about justice in a universal light to ending the chapter clearly denoting that justice is incapable of being universal because “justice bends to every person’s ideas of social expediency” (63).

Tuesday, April 13, 2010

Modern Constructivism

It’s a little late but, better late than never. Kant’s form of deontology can be seen as a kind of moral constructivism. According to Rawls, what Kant “constructs” is “the content of the doctrine”(3.2). This means that the universality of a particular categorical imperative that pass the laws of universality are considered to be constructed by “a procedure of construction worked through by rational agents subject to various reasonable constraints”(3.2). Kant believes that the procedure to construct these doctrines is not what is being constructed. This procedure, the categorical imperative procedure, is derived from our everyday understanding and our implicit awareness of the need for practical reason. Judgments made like this are not correct because the outcome is correct. These judgments are correct because the procedure and all the rational agents at work in the procedure make that outcome correct.

These thoughts have a basis which upon they work. The basis is that everyone is free, reasonable, and rational. With this basis in mind, the categorical imperative procedure can be followed to construct doctrines. Besides needing people to be both reasonable and rational, this categorical imperative procedure demonstrates that everyone is both reasonable and rational. We are rational in the beginning when we rationalize the procedure in order to follow it. We are reasonable because we are using the categorical imperative procedure to begin with. Rawls believes that Kant thinks that if we were not reasonable, we would not both to check our maxims against this procedure in order to see if it holds up to the law of universality (3.3). It also shows that we are reasonable when, if our maxim follows this procedure and is rejected by the law of universality, we go back and take an interest in trying to fix it.

I believe that this procedure is not as fixed as Kant would like to think it is. It only works when the person putting it to use is both rational and reasonable. I believe that this is a much harder thing to ask for humanity than Kant does. Kant simply assumes that all of humanity, with a few exceptions of course, are rational and reasonable beings. I do not believe that most of humanity is as reasonable and rational as Kant would like to think. Think about all the times that you have stopped and thought to yourself, “What was he thinking?” or “That really isn’t fair.” It happens quite a lot, does it not? Most of the time, thoughts like these are based on decisions other people made, decision where they were clearly not being reasonable or rational enough to use the procedure that Kant believes everyone naturally can and does use.

Virtue can be pleasurable....

In chapter four of Utilitarianism by John Stuart Mill, the philosopher explores the contention between desiring pleasure and desiring virtue. In order to do this he further defines the notion of happiness as “the only thing desirable as an end; all other things being desirable as a means to that end” (35). Does this mean morality is subsidiary to happiness? Mill answers this question by explaining that the relationship between virtue and vice correlate to the one between pleasure and pain. Virtue and pleasure are the equivalent because both are means for happiness, in the same manner that the absence of vice and pain lead to happiness. What’s even more controversial than this the idea that virtue and pleasure can be one in the same, is that in a person can desire virtue for itself (36). For example, I can desire virtuousness by becoming a nun for the sake of the virtues that type of life entails. Becoming a nun was the means to attaining virtue and therefore achieving happiness. According to Mill, anything that is desired for its own sake is craved for as a part of happiness (38). Desiring virtue is initially a means to happiness but can become a part of happiness as shown in the example above.


The contention between pleasures and virtue encompasses one of the susceptibilities for the proof of utility. Mill believes that it is a “physical and metaphysical impossibility” to desire things other than in proportion the pleasure it offers (39). This means that the only reason a person would desire virtue is because it offers some degree of pleasure. Even if leading a life of virtue means leading a life with less personal happiness. As the philosopher explains in previous chapters of this essay, the noble person is the best means to happiness because they sacrifice their own desires for the sake of a greater food. The notion of virtue is something that is different for every person. Does the doctrine of utility account for these different and sometimes even conflicting notions of virtuousness? For example, a pro-life activist believes virtue means preserving life at all cost. When a baby is conceived, abortion is an act of murder in this notion of virtue. However, a pro-choice activist believes virtue means sparing life for a greater good. When a sick a person is suffering, helping them pass on is the virtuous thing to under a pro-choice ideal. What is the greater good in this case? With which notion of virtue would the doctrine of utility agree with?

Monday, April 12, 2010

Where's the Proof, Sidgwick?

In this reading, Sidgwick defines Utilitarianism and tries to come up with the proof of Utilitarianism. Sidgwick puts forth that Utilitarianism is the conduct that “will produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole,” or greatest amount of happiness of all whose happiness is affected (408). In this manner, Sidgwick also defines the greatest happiness as the greatest possible surplus of pleasure over pain (409). In this definition, we can all see the inherent problem: it is hard to compare the pleasure and pains of different people/beings. How can we deny the happiness of one person over the happiness of another? To clarify this point, Sidgwick explains to make the number enjoying the happiness as great as possible, weighing happiness gained by the majority against happiness lost by the remainder. But does everyone’s happiness count equally? Sidgwick is with Bentham saying, “Everybody count for one and nobody for more than one” (412).
In the second chapter of this reading, Sidgwick looks to find the proof of Utilitarianism, asking the question, “Why should we live for the happiness of the greatest number and not just for our own happiness?” (414) This is a big problem that Sidgwick does not exactly answer. Admitting that Common Sense says that we should seek our own happiness, Sidgwick answers that “it cannot be proved that the difference between his own happiness and another’s happiness is not for him all-important” (416). To prove to an egoist that utilitarianism is superior would only be to make an egoist accept that utilitarianism is a mean to his end (his own happiness). In other words, the happiness of the greatest number will probably include his happiness; therefore, the egoist can accept this theory. The egoist believes that “nature designed him to seek his own happiness” to which Sidgwick responds that one person’s happiness cannot be a more important part of Good, universally, than the equal happiness of any other person. With all these problems with finding a proof, Sidgwick wants to find a synthesis that binds unconnected and conflicting principles of common moral reasoning into a complete and harmonious system (418). Sidgwick never really does this though. Sidgwick comes to a quick conclusion that common sense proves Utilitarianism. He concludes that the proof of Utilitarianism is that the morality of Common Sense is exhibits the Utilitarian principle that common sense naturally appeals to (418). In other words, common sense follows the conventions of Utilitarianism, so Utilitarianism must be true, given this proof.

Thursday, April 8, 2010

No Universal Human Nature?? Say What?!?!

In his writings on ethics, entitled ethics Thomas Nagel discusses ethics. He starts out quite bluntly by saying that what he is about to write “will be very general and not very complete”, but that he hopes that it will prove that the enterprise of ethics is not hopeless. Nagel first defines four reasons for our morality. The first is autonomy, or the things that we do for ourselves, the second is obligation, or the special consideration that we have toward certain people in our lives, the third is neutral values, or universal values for the common good, and finally deontology, or the reasons that we treat other people decently.

His main argument is between the two extremes, autonomy and deontology. This argument boils down essentially to objectivity versus subjectivity. The subjectivity of autonomy, and one’s personal desires and appetites versus the objectivity of moral absolutes which help govern our actions. Nagel believes that we live within a delicate balance of the two. Our own personal desires for things that we want to do but have no real effect on the good of the world, must be balanced with the moral considerations of human nature. In general, Nagel would say that most people live within the confines of this balance, making sure that your appetites do not get in the way of your morality and that your morality does not keep you from getting what you need. For example, consider the overly good person who does not take bread that has fallen off of the back of a truck even on the verge of starvation. Or the counterexample of the sociopath who does not consider any morals on his or her path to whatever it is that he or she desires. Nagel would consider both of these people outliers and both of them foolish for they stray from the natural balance between desires and morals.

Nagel also says that politics is inextricably tied to ethics. He says that “there can be no ethics without politics”. Nagel says that these two things are tied because they both have to do with human interaction. The institutions that people live in determine the morals that they live by. And therefore, politics determines ethics. This would suggest that under varying political systems the people may have different ethical philosophies. This would also suggest that there is no universal, natural morals which determine the way people act. Nagel suggests that it would be a folly to try and invent a universal human nature to try and define our political theory. However, he does believe that there could be a partial solution; however he never postulates what it could be. I think that I agree with Nagel’s contention that there is no such thing as universal morals. I believe that a persons’ moral code is determined by the environment that they live in and the experiences that they have and not a natural law. In turn, I also believe that there is no such thing as a perfect government which coincides with a universal human nature.

Deontology: Totally Impractical

In the text entitled Contemporary Deontology by Ann Davis, the author goes through the basic tenements of deontology by describing its characteristics and constraints. In essence, Davis defines deontology as the sincere and rational avoidance of wrongdoing that ultimately results in less wrongdoing (Davis, 216). An example would be not murdering someone based on the rational argument that murdering is wrong. No matter what the consequences, murdering is always wrong. Within this, there are constraints that guide the deontologist in judgment that are negatively formatted, narrowly framed and narrowly directed (Davis, 208). Meaning, a guideline for the deontologists would be "don't steal" or "don't kill".

Of course, this way of thinking and tight constraints implies a high moral character. That is to say, it would be considered good for a person never to lie for any circumstance, or commit murder. Yet, this application in life shows that this way of thinking can also be considered morally questionable. For example, people who harbored Jews in Nazi occupied Europe. Surely they would have to lie in order to keep other human beings alive in their homes, yet according to the deontologist they are doing wrong? It seems absurd. Davis writes "(Deontologists) are not as responsible for the foreseen consequences of (their) actions" (Davis, 209). Meaning, the deontologist would say that the person who tells the Nazis that they are harboring Jews is better than the liar who says he is not due to the fact that he’s telling the truth. They would say that the result has nothing to do with the consequences of his actions, which is completely ridiculous in application.

On the other hand, however, it brings up the interesting question of weighing the life of another human against another. That is to say, if one is to reject the deontological position, it assumes that in the case of murder, there are certain circumstances where it is permissible. Davis discusses this problem by stating that even if the person may be deserving of death, the deontologist still does not have the right to do him harm (Davis, 207). In essence, unless the deontological rational is accepted, it is impossible to say that murder is wrong absolutely. According to this logic, it would seem that a non-deontological stance would be susceptible to a slippery slope in which almost any murder can be excused. For example, if we could choose to kill a dictator that plans on committing genocide on his people, surely a rational person would sacrifice an evil man to save innocent lives. But consider another example; a robber kills a police officer in a heist because the police officer was shooting at him. Unless the robber is a deontologist, he could say that his murder was permissible because it was self defense, even though we as observers would see it as murder.

Even though Deontology aims at the termination of wrongdoing, the only way it “works” is if the entire world were a strict deontologist, which is completely inconceivable.

Parameters for Determining Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative Values

In Christine M. Korsgaard’s Creating the Kingdom of Ends, the idea of togetherness and having a shared experience are the most critical pieces of information. Before analyzing Korsgaard’s beliefs and ideas, there are some terms that need to be explained. These terms are “agent-relative”, “agent-neutral”, “subjective” and “objective”. Agent-relative and subjective are the two terms which relate to each other while objective and agent-neutral relate to each other. I will explain this providing the meanings of these four terms. We’ll start with agent- relative. When something is agent-relative, then that thing is related to an individual and nobody else. In other words, anything agent-relative deals only with a particular agent and no other agent. This is connected to subjective matters as these matters are considered by Korsgaard as “personal property” (“Ends” 267). Agent-neutral values and objective matters are similar by the same way. Agent-neutral values are values pertaining to all agents and objective values are “common property” shared by all agents. Korsgaard responds to many of Nagel’s beliefs on values and agents. Nagel claims that whenever something subjective exists, it must’ve come from something objective. Right away, Korsgaard says that she cannot accept this argument. But I think that the argument may be justifiable. Take for example, an individual who is considering donating money, food and clothing to third world countries. This decision is subjective and agent-relative because the individual feels that it is good for him to help others in dire need. But behind this decision is the individual’s understanding that the preservation of life is critical not only to someone who can buy their own food and pay their own bills but also to the people who can’t. In the end, the decision is about the individual feeling good, but in actuality, the decision was based on a universal concept of life preservation.

Korsgaard continues to look into agent-neutral values and determines that there are 2 interpretations of these agent-neutral values. Her two interpretations are called “objective realism” and “intersubjectivism”. Objective realism revolves around the idea that something exists for its own reason and not for any other agent or matter. The example used by Korsgaard is the sun. It shines not because it’s vital for life to exist, but just because it’s just what it does. This led to Korsgaard looking into another one of Nagel’s claims on agent-relative values which I found interesting. Nagel explains why “reasons for autonomy”, “deontological reasons and “reasons of obligation” will always be agent-relative. Beginning with reasons for autonomy, if one desires to achieve something “idiosyncratic”, it is impossible for this decision to be agent-neutral because the individual desiring to achieve this will know that it is good for himself and not necessarily good for everybody else. He also knows that he would not get any assistance with his task or “project”. Next would be deontological reasons. These values can never be seen as agent-neutral because an individual acting against moral restrictions is acting against what is good for him or herself for what he or she considers a good end result. Finally, reasons for obligation must also never be looked at as agent- neutral because a relationship such as mother and son will cause all actions made by either the mother or son to be for the reason that they are family and not

Tuesday, April 6, 2010

Classical and Modern Moral Philosophy

In this article, Rawls starts out by stating the differences between classical philosophy and modern moral philosophy. He explains that by classical philosophy he means that of ancient Greece and by modern moral philosophy he means in the period of time from 1600 to 1800 (1). Rawls then goes to summarize both the classic and modern philosophies. He concludes that the Greeks “focused on the idea of the highest good as an attractive ideal, as the reasonable pursuit of our true happiness”(4). The main difference in the two philosophies came from three major developments in the time period. These developments were the Reformation, the development of the modern state, and the development of modern science (5). With the aspect of religion, there were five very important differences. In modern moral philosophy, Christianity was an authoritative religion, it was a religion of salvation, it was doctrinal, it was a religion of priests, and it was an expansionist religion (6). These five factors, along with the constant branching and wars during the Reformation, changed the question that was raised by the Greeks which was simply how to live, to the question of how to live with people from a different religion (8).

Later in the article, Rawls outlines Kant’s thoughts on science and religion. Kant is not troubled by, “The diversity and conflicts between our moral judgments”(15). Kant believes in what he calls “common human reason”(15) in which everyone judges in roughly the same way. He goes as far as to say that even the philosopher cannot have moral principles different than those of ordinary human reason. For Kant, science and morals are on equal grounds with one another. Both science and morals are forms of reason, one is theoretical and the other is pure, practical reason (15). I would agree with Kant in the respect that both science and morals are both forms of reason. Science is the theoretical form and morals are the pure or practical form. Following Kant’s idea of “common human reason,” this makes sense. The sciences are areas where theories are formed and tested. Said theories are always challenged and tested and reaffirmed. This is all done within human reason. Morals can also be a form of reason, though not so far as in all the speculating done within the theoretical reason. With morals, a person acts practically. These actions are pure forms or reason expressing themselves without needing to be put in theory and tested out beforehand.